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Abstract 
 
Two elements can be seen to evolve progressively with globalization: political risk and mega 
projects. Although a fair amount of research has been carried out in regards to political risk and 
mega projects as separate units of investigation, few studies have attempted to combine the two. 
This thesis fills a void in the existing literature by providing a specialized approach to political 
risk, focusing on political risk of oil and gas mega projects in particular. Drawing on a 
comprehensive dataset of political risk in developing countries, the investigation consists of three 
constituent parts: a descriptive empirical analysis of 90 cases of political risk between 1998 and 
2005; a comparative analysis with 240 cases of political risk across all affected industries within 
that same period; and three case studies. My intention is to illustrate the conceptual framework 
and to establish the causal mechanism at play. The findings of this text highlight the need for a 
more thorough and current political risk- and mega project theory, one which incorporates the 
important aspect of globalization and consequently sees political risk as a multidimensional 
phenomenon. The findings support the relevance of the obsolescing bargain mechanism, 
challenge the proposed significance of non-governmental activism and environmental issues, and, 
perhaps most decisively, accentuate the importance of the need of a social license to operate.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2001, armed youth, ostensibly angered by environmental degradation and economic neglect 
attacked, and attempted to overtake, Shell‟s southern Nigerian flow station, resulting in 18 
months of reparations and a loss in production of 40.000 barrels of oil per day.
1
 On a different 
note, in 2004, Venezuela‟s President Hugo Chavez announced that the royalty paid by foreign oil 
companies would increase from 1 percent of the sale price to 16.6 percent. The purpose of this 
change, according to Chavez, was to secure control over the country‟s energy reserves; he boldly 
stated that “we are no longer going to give our oil away for reasons that no longer exist, if they 
ever did.” No warning had been given to the affected companies and projects.2 Moreover, in 
2003, Canadian firm Talisman withdrew from its 25 percent stake in an oil exploration and 
pipeline project in Sudan following prolonged pressure from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), shareholders, and foreign governments.
3
 Talisman was accused of providing the 
Sudanese government with oil revenues used to finance the civil war, as well as “turning a blind 
eye to atrocities committed by government security forces and their allied troops against local 
people in the name of protecting the security of oil-producing areas.”4 These examples perfectly 
demonstrate the investigation of this thesis, namely the negative effects a socio-political event 
may have upon an investment, popularly referred to as political risk. This text, however, will 
provide a more specialized examination by focusing on the amalgamation of two increasingly 
important and relevant elements: the oil and gas industry and mega projects.   
 
Political risk is subjected to several interpretations and definitions. Yet, in regards to mega 
projects it can be deemed to constitute socio-political events with the potential to negatively and 
significantly affect the goals of a project. In the last few months we have seen dramatic upheaval 
in oil rich countries like Libya and Iran, and combined with continuous „business difficulties‟ in 
                                                          
1 “Nigerian Shell facility destroyed,” BBC News, 29 September 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1570037.stm>.  
2 “Venezuela raises oil drilling tax,” BBC News, 11 October 2004, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3732224.stm>. 
3
 “Talisman pulls out of Sudan,” BBC News, 10 March 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2835713.stm>. 
4
 “Oil firms accused over Sudan abuses,” BBC News, 4 May 2000, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/736013.stm>. 
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Nigeria, Russia and Venezuela, as well as ongoing instability in Iraq, political risk is undeniably 
a highly relevant subject. There are several reasons to why this is both an interesting and valuable 
issue of investigation. As will be pointed out in more detail later in this thesis, even though a fair 
amount of research has been carried out in regards to political risk in general, existing literature 
has not adequately dealt with political risk in regards to oil and gas mega projects in particular, 
and this study hence addresses a gap in the existing research. What is more, as separate entities, 
both the oil and gas industry and mega projects are identified as being particularly vulnerable to 
political risk. Drawing upon that assumption, this thesis will seek to unveil how political risk is 
manifested in oil and gas mega projects. 
  
Political risk is not a new phenomenon. One of the most well-known incidents took place in 
Mexico in 1938, when the Mexican government expropriated most of the foreign oil industry. 
This was a key event in that a developing nation showed its power in the face of powerful foreign 
interests. Regarding expropriations, Jones (2005) points out that until the 1960s and 1970s, it was 
a relatively rare occurrence and although it increased during this period, only a small percentage 
of foreign-owned firms in developing nations suffered this fate. What is interesting, however, is 
that among the companies that were affected, a large proportion was engaged in resource 
extraction, with petroleum and mining standing out as two key industries. This shows that natural 
resource extraction in general, and the oil and gas industry in particular, has a long history of 
political risk vulnerability.  
 
A mega project, on the other hand, can be seen as a complex, politicized, and scrutinized venture 
of more than USD 1 billion, carrying great risk and uncertainty, and with the potential of greatly 
affecting the local community and environment. Even though mega projects are not a new 
phenomenon it is nevertheless an increasing occurrence and we are experiencing a trend where 
mega projects are initiated across the globe. The issue of political risk, however, is most 
prevalent in regards to developing countries and the units of investigation are thus restricted to 
the classification of these. Seeing that mega projects are deemed to have a substantial impact 
upon the local community and the environment, the „real world‟ relevance of this study is also 
significant.  
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But why is political risk important to oil and gas mega projects? Successful assessment, handling, 
and understanding of political risk are important factors in achieving the goals of a project simply 
because political risk effects, which constitute the actual realization of political risks (Jakobsen 
2007, 2010), have the potential to negatively affect project objectives. The initial objective of a 
project is “to deliver a physical asset with specified functionalities and capacities to accomplish 
some business purpose” (Rolstadås & Schiefloe 2010:4). In regards to oil and gas mega projects, 
the principal business purpose is profit. From this point of view, political risk is a potential 
obstacle to the revenue of a project and is hence addressed in order to minimize this risk.     
 
The study of the political risk of oil and gas mega projects ought to be of interests to a number of 
different actors. First and foremost, the oil and gas industry in general, and partakers in oil and 
gas mega projects in particular, obviously benefit from having a strong focus on political risk and 
the consequences it may have upon their ventures. Also, the political risk insurance industry, 
which habitually pays foremost attention to single country analysis, would arguably profit by 
specializing their approach to include, at the very least, industry specific risks. Furthermore, it 
can also be of interest to organizations, associations, and institutions concerned with the 
improvement of developing countries and how investments in the oil and gas industry in general, 
and oil and gas mega projects in particular, can shape the host country. 
 
This thesis, then, will seek to answer three specific research questions: 
 
 Why are oil and gas mega projects considered to be specifically vulnerable to political 
risk? 
 How does political risk differ for oil and gas mega projects compared to projects in other 
industries?  
 Which effects, actors, and sources of political risk are most prevalent for oil and gas mega 
projects? 
The text draws upon Jo Jakobsen‟s doctoral thesis titled „Political risk for multinational 
companies: Sources and effects‟. His dataset is utilized to extract 90 incidents of political risk of 
oil and gas mega projects between 1998 and 2005. This does not imply, however, that I am 
repeating the study of Jakobsen. Rather, with the utilization of his dataset, I am able to build upon 
a thorough summary and a comprehensive coding scheme of political risk in developing countries 
and thereby specialize on a feature not paid particular attention to by Jakobsen, namely the 
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presentation of a comprehensive empirical analysis of the political risk of oil and gas mega 
projects. The dependent variable of this investigation, then, is realized political risk effects, or 
operationally speaking, events count. The independent variables are the underlying sources of 
political risk and the actors through which these are realized.  
 
This thesis is divided into four sections excluding this introduction. Chapter 2 draws attention to 
existing political risk- and mega project theory and research, the causal framework employed for 
the investigation of this text, and specific hypotheses based on these. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodology, including operational challenges and limitations. Chapter 4 presents a descriptive 
analysis of the political risk of oil and gas mega projects as well as a comparative descriptive 
analysis of oil and gas mega projects and the remaining cases of Jakobsen‟s dataset. Chapter 4 
also includes a discussion of the findings, incorporating the conclusions of the hypotheses. 
Chapter 5 highlights three specific oil and gas mega projects (Sakhalin II in Russia, Mazeikiu 
Nafta in Lithuania, and Camisea in Peru), with the purpose of illustrating the conceptual 
framework of political risk and to establish the causal mechanisms at play. Lastly, Chapter 5 
presents a conclusion of the main findings, its implications, limitations, and recommendations for 
further research.  
 
The conclusions of this thesis support the view of oil and gas mega projects as particularly 
vulnerable to political risk. The study also provides new and interesting material regarding the 
causal mechanisms involved. Whereas political risk- and mega project theory pays foremost 
attention to political institutions and government intervention as essential elements of political 
risk, this thesis highlights the need of a social license to operate as an equally relevant factor. A 
social license to operate (SLO) can be defined as a project‟s ongoing approval from the 
stakeholders involved, and especially from the location‟s local community and citizens. Realized 
political risk effects such as sabotage, kidnapping, and protests are well represented in the 
dataset. Even though existent theory recognizes the impact the oil and gas industry in general, 
and mega projects in particular, may have upon the local community and environment, the afore-
mentioned components have not received much focus. On a more general note, the significance 
of globalization is underlined in regards to the importance of approaching political risk as a 
multidimensional phenomenon, denoting that not only local, but also regional and global 
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conditions must be taken into consideration. This is epitomized by the relevancy of foreign states 
as an important actor through which political risks are realized. Regarding the characteristics of 
the political risk of oil and gas mega projects compared to other industries, they are comparable 
along both main dimensions and sub-categories, although the distribution for oil and gas mega 
projects is more concentrated along specific sub-categories. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY 
 
2.1 Mega projects and globalization  
 
Globalization is one of the major catchphrases of recent years and is often employed to signify 
perceived negative, as well as positive, changes in world affairs. Though frequently used as an 
explanatory factor, a coherent understanding of the phenomenon is lacking and definitions vary 
across different schools of thought. Notoriously difficult to define and grasp, it is hard to disagree 
with Dicken (2007:3), who claims that “‟globalization‟ is one of the most used, but also one of 
the most misused and of the most confused, words around today”. Others also point to the 
elusiveness of this phenomenon (e.g., el-Ojeili & Hayden 2006:1; Held & McGrew 2002). 
Skeptics argue that much of the globalization literature fails to identify “the spatial referents for 
the global” and as a consequence of this, the term becomes so broad that it is impossible to 
operationalize empirically and consequently meaningless as a way of making sense of the world 
(Held & McGrew 2002:4). Whether or not globalization is a label given to something that is not 
much more than a natural evolution of society is not a debate this thesis will engage in, however. 
It is rather the analysis of its effects that is of interest. The purpose of this section, then, is to seek 
an inclusive definition of globalization from which its consequences on political risk and oil and 
gas mega projects can be investigated.  
 
One basic definition of globalization sees the phenomenon as “the expanding scale, growing 
magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social 
interaction” (Held & McGrew, cited in el-Ojeili & Hayden 2006:13). But how is the process of 
globalization relevant to the two main elements of this study, mega projects and political risk? As 
pointed out by Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter (2003:3), infrastructure plays a very 
important part in this age of globalization, and megaprojects are central to this development 
because “infrastructure is increasingly being built as megaprojects”. When talking about 
infrastructure projects, it is perhaps airports, bridges, highways and railways that first spring to 
people‟s mind; one might, therefore, question the relevance of oil and gas in this regard. Gigantic 
pipeline systems, refineries, and seaport distribution plants, however, also fall under the umbrella 
term of infrastructure and the relevance of these must not be eluded. The importance of oil and 
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gas mega projects in the global infrastructure development is supported by Orr & Kennedy 
(2008:112) who argue that there is a considerable need for investment in energy exploration, 
production, and distribution to accommodate predicted global demands. Furthermore, Douglas 
(2005:1) argues that “globalization needs global-size project” where expectations of size and 
production are intensified with each new project.  
 
Belgrave (1985) draws attention to one very important aspect in relation to the globalization of 
world affairs. He argues that a project might be highly capable in regards to technology or 
funding, but failure to address and assess geopolitical trends and elements might still result in 
project failure. The importance of globalization is also highlighted by Jarvis (2008:16) who 
argues that “while political risk is obviously a function of political activity in domestic settings, it 
is increasingly experienced as a function of globalization and interdependence.” With the flow of 
globalization it is also extremely important to point out that many, if not all, oil and gas mega 
projects are characteristically either international or global in nature, and that is a very important 
factor in determining the political risks involved in a given project. Notwithstanding the debate of 
whether or not globalization is making the world more similar or more divergent, it is 
nevertheless clear that the process of globalization corresponds to a growing amount of 
stakeholders involved in a given project, and especially so for mega projects. More stakeholders 
equals to more complexity which in turn leads to a greater potential of realized political risk 
effects, an element that will be highlighted through the presentation of the Camisea project in the 
case analyses section of the paper. Furthermore, mega projects are frequently established in 
locations outside of the actors‟ home country, naturally increasing the level of uncertainty 
involved. This is popularly referred to as the ‟liability of foreignness‟ (Javernick-Will & Levitt 
2009). 
 
Furthermore, with the continuous search for new investments, mega projects are initiated in just 
about every corner of the world, and this naturally entails an increasing awareness and knowledge 
of the possible risks this constitutes. It is also extremely important to keep in mind that whenever 
a new investment takes place, it is not only entering the political, social and economic 
environment of the host country. It also becomes part of the regional and global environment in 
which all players are operating and the position of all actors concerned must be investigated in 
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order to obtain a complete overview of the potential political risks involved (Simon 1984). What 
we can denote from this observation is that political risk in mega projects is far from being a 
mere project ↔ host country relationship; it is rather a multidimensional aspect which can be laid 
out in the following manner (drawing upon Simon, 1984):  
 
Figure 2.1: The multidimensional aspect of political risk  
 
                                                    Home country setting   
Mega Project        Host country setting        Global setting 
                                  Regional/International setting 
 
This figure points out the important multidimensional aspect of political risk, where different 
settings, or environments, are intertwined, and where incidents in one setting have the potential to 
cause reactions in another, which of course is a key characteristic of globalization. It is clear, 
then, that the nature of political risk has changed and now constitutes a “highly complex, 
multidimensional phenomenon” (Jakobsen 2010:482). Having drawn attention to the importance 
of including globalization as a key element in the investigation of mega projects and political 
risk, the next step is to look deeper into these two central components. 
 
2.1.1 What constitutes a mega project? 
 
In order to make sense of the notion of a mega project in particular, it is first and foremost 
important to comprehend the idea of a project in general. Drawing upon Müller & Turner 
(2007:7) a project can be described as “a temporary organization to which resources are assigned 
to undertake a unique, novel and transient endeavor managing the inherent uncertainty and need 
for integration in order to deliver beneficial objectives of change”. The view of a project as 
particular and unique is also supported by Kreiner (1995); Löwendahl (1995); and Shenhar et. al 
(2001). Mats Engwall (2003), on the other hand, is careful to point out that earlier experience, 
simultaneous events, and future intentions also affect how a project is carried out. Despite some 
varying definitions within the existing literature it seems fair to argue, then, that although not 
being a completely unique and incomparable event, a project is deemed to be highly specific and 
individualistic. 
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Having discussed the nature of a project, what, then, constitutes a mega project? As pointed out 
in the introductory part of this paper, existing mega project theory is rather limited and a clear 
definition is found wanting. Classifications vary across different sectors, and characterizations are 
frequently laid out in such a manner that any operationalization or generalization is impossible. A 
good example of the discrepancy that exists within the literature is that the term „mega project‟ is 
not universally made use of. Koivu, Levitt & Pulido (2003:1) have taken the term mega project 
one step further and they have come up with a new classification altogether, so-called „Global 
Change Projects.‟ These are defined as “large, multinational projects that are the vehicle to 
enable strategic change for corporations, governments and foundations”. Examples they include 
are the development of a multi-country gas pipeline in Central Asia and the US-Mexico cross-
border water projects. Hobbs & Miller (2005:43), on the other hand, employ the label „large 
complex projects‟ which they see as marked by “high uncertainty and high risk,” as well as great 
scrutiny, including social and environmental acceptability.  
 
The fact that Hobbs & Miller (2005) employ the characterization „large complex projects‟ is very 
interesting as the element of complexity can be seen to form a division in existing mega project 
characterizations. Among those who do not pay specific attention to the aspect of complexity are 
Altshuler & Luberhoff (2003) and Gellert & Lynch (2003). Altshuler & Luberhoff (2003:2) 
define mega projects as “initiatives that are physical, very expensive, and public” with a cost of at 
least USD 250 million (real 2002 dollars). Gellert & Lynch (2003), for their part, define mega 
projects as ventures which “transform landscapes rapidly, intentionally, and profoundly in very 
visible ways.” On the other hand, the importance of including complexity in defining a mega 
project is emphasized by Kovaka (cited in Zhai, Xin & Cheng 2009:99); Zhai, Xin & Cheng 
(2009:99), who argue that “the size of the project is always defined in terms of such variables as 
the scale of investment, the number of project staff, the social impact of the project, and the 
complexity of the project”; Flyvbjerg (2009); and Rolstadås & Schiefloe (2010). 
 
Rolstadås & Schiefloe‟s (2010) definition of mega projects is particularly shaped by the inclusion 
of project complexity as a key factor, meaning that a USD 10 billon project is not necessarily 
classified as a mega project while a USD 1 billion project might be, depending on the level of 
complexity involved. Regarding a specific threshold value for constituting a mega project, 
 
 
- 10 - 
 
esteemed mega project scholar Bent Flyvbjerg operates with different standards in different 
publications. Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg & Rothengatter (2002), though, sets USD 1 billion as a general 
threshold value. Flyvbjerg (2009) is careful to point out, however, that „mega‟ also denotes the 
magnitude of the tasks involved in developing and organizing projects of such a scale. He hence 
lends support to Rolstadås and Schiefloe‟s approach of including complexity as a vital variable. 
Seeing that project complexity can only be measured through the identification of project 
challenges and the quality of the organization in regards to the project in question, such a 
classification of mega projects necessitates in-depth knowledge of a project before categorizing it 
as mega or not. This will be drawn further attention to in the methodology section of this thesis. 
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter (2003:9) also argue that “megaprojects are increasingly 
becoming highly public and intensely politicized ventures drawing substantial international 
attention with much potential for generating negative publicity” and with a significant impact on 
the local community as well as the environment. Kovaka (cited in Zhai, Xin & Cheng 2009:99) 
and Hauswirth et al. (2004) also draws attention to the impact of mega projects on the local 
community and on the consequent risk faced by such projects as a result of public scrutiny.  
 
2.2 What is political risk? 
 
In order to understand the concept of political risk it is helpful to first be familiar with the 
concept of risk in general. According to Giddens (2002:21); “risk refers to hazards that are 
actively assessed in relation to future possibilities” and “presumes a society that actively tries to 
break away from its past – the prime characteristic, indeed, of modern industrial civilization.” 
The concept of risk, then, can be seen to evolve progressively with the process of globalization. 
Before embarking upon the actual presentation of political risk in relation to petroleum mega 
projects in particular, it is necessary to draw attention to some important aspects of political risk 
analysis in general. A wide array of literature is dedicated to the concept of political risk. As far 
as a uniform definition and application is concerned, though; no agreement has yet been reached. 
There are many scholars focusing of political risk as an important element to business in more 
general terms (e.g., Bremmer 2005; Bunn & Mustagaoglou 1978; Chase, Khule & Walther 1988; 
Clark 1997; Fitzpatrick 1983; Hofer & Haller 1980; Jakobsen 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010; Jarvis 
2008; Kobrin 1979; Miller 1992; Schroeder 2008; Simon 1984, 1985). There is also a substantial 
amount of literature focusing on political risk in relation to specific projects (e.g., Bruzelius, 
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Flyvbjerg & Rothengatter 2002; Dikmen, Birgonul & Han 2006; Frynas 1998; Khattab, Anchor 
& Davies 2007; Lam 1999; Pinto 2000; Westerfeld 2002). Studies with specific focus on big oil 
and gas project are less common, however, with some valuable exceptions (e.g., Dey, Tabucanon 
& Ogunlana 1994; Frynas & Mellahi 2003; Walls & Dyer 1996). 
 
Many of the above mentioned authors touch upon similar question in regards to political risk. 
Though not all of the information provided is relevant to political risk in petroleum mega projects 
in particular, it is nevertheless valuable in regards to gaining an enhanced awareness of political 
risk in general. Political risk has been a popular topic of investigation since the 1970s; 
incidentally, that was the decade in which the concept of „globalization‟ started to appear for real 
(Held & McGrew 2002:1). Without dwelling too much on this, it seems feasible to argue along 
the lines of Giddens (2002), that risk tends to evolve progressively with globalization.  
 
The early literature on political risk was mainly concerned with political events in the host 
country (e.g. Robock 1971, Bunn & Mustafaoglu 1978). Robock (1971:7) argued that  
 
“political risk in international business exists (1) when discontinuities occur in the business 
environment, (2) when they are difficult to anticipate and (3) when they result from political 
change. To constitute a „risk‟ these changes in the business environment must have the 
potential for significantly affecting the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise”. 
 
Bunn & Mustafaoglu (1978:1558) argued that a political risk effect can be seen as any outcome 
in the host country which, if it occurred, would negatively affect the success of a venture. Kobrin 
(1979) stated that even though these early definitions fell short of providing a thoroughly 
inclusive definition, they emphasized the important trait of political risk as a potential threat. 
Kobrin (1979:70) built upon this feature and argued that “one can say only that political events 
may affect the firm; whether they do so is a function of both environmental conditions and 
industry and firm-specific factors.” The relevance of regarding political risk as industry- and firm 
specific, then, was established relatively early in the literature.  
 
In 1984, Jeffrey Simon lamented the lack of theory in political risk analysis, while also drawing 
attention to the importance of expanding the focus from the host country to also include home 
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country and an international and global setting, which now forms an integral part of political risk 
theory (as indicated by Figure 2.1). Fortune & White (2005), in their review of 63 publications 
focusing on critical factors for the success of projects, found only scant congruity in the literature. 
The only factors linked to political risk, „risks addressed/assessed/managed‟ and „political 
stability,‟ were only cited in 13 and six publications respectively. Of these, seven were based on 
empirical data mainly obtained from surveys; eight were empirical studies with data mainly 
obtained from case analyses; and four were purely theoretical. It is important to point out that the 
63 publications in question deal with projects in general and not oil and gas mega projects in 
particular. What it does tell us, however, is that generally speaking, political risk is not given the 
attention it likely deserves from business executives. The problem is not that political risk is not 
evaluated as part of an investment decision, though, because to a greater or lesser degree, it 
certainly is. The problem is how political risk is evaluated. The fact of the matter is that political 
risk analysis is still too often broken down into a mere country-analysis. With the tide of 
globalization sweeping across the globe, such an approach is no longer adequate, if it ever was.  
 
The main deficiency in existing political risk theory, however, is the lack of empirical analyses. 
Jakobsen (2005:6) points out that “nationalism, ideology, and state preferences are theoretical 
constructs that are not easily measured and operationalized.” The same can be said for many 
other aspects connected to political risk, making empirical investigations difficult. With a lack of 
empirical analyses in relation to political risk is general, it is obvious that it is very rare in regards 
to oil and gas mega projects in particular. The lack of empirical research means that the theory is 
not easily falsified, laying the groundwork for a position in which a web of reinforcing ideas are 
spun. By providing an empirical analysis of political risk events, that is a trend which this text 
seeks to evade. Having drawn attention to the theoretical foundation of this thesis, the following 
section will explain its practical approach through the presentation of the causal framework and 
its components. 
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2.3 The causal framework 
 
As drawn attention to in the introductory stages of this paper, political risk is a multidimensional 
phenomenon. This entails that it is very seldom possible to track a distinct realized political risk 
effect from one single source and carried out through one specific actor. In addition to the fact 
that there are often both several sources and actors leading to a political risk effect, risk 
mitigation techniques are incorporated in the attempt to minimize the occurrence of realized 
effects, and some industries and projects might be more vulnerable to political risk than others. 
The following figure presents the causal framework created by Jakobsen (2007:27) (with the 
inclusion of industry-specifics as the only alteration), incorporating the multidimensionality of 
political risk and representing the practical rationale behind the investigation of this thesis.  
 
Figure 2.2: The causal framework (Jakobsen 2007:27) 
 
Risk mitigation (÷) 
 
 
                    Sources (+/÷)                    Actors (+/÷)                      Effects 
 
  
Industry and project-specifics (+/÷) 
 
Notes: ÷ are factors which may reduce the likelihood of realized political risk; + are factors which may 
increase the likelihood of realized political risk. 
 
Firstly, this section presents a general introduction to effects, actors, and sources, followed by an 
in-depth description of industry and project specific risks. Finally, based on the theoretical 
foundation already presented, and the upcoming industry- and project specific risk section, the 
hypotheses of this study will be presented. Seeing that the element of risk mitigation is not 
directly relevant to the investigation of this thesis, it will not be specifically touched upon. Note 
that much of the discussion herein is based on Jakobsen (2007). (A comprehensive list of political 
risk variables can be found in the coding schemes included in the appendix of this thesis.) 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
Effects naturally denote realized political risk effects and include elements such as sabotage, 
expropriation, cancelation of contracts, and NGO activism. The various effects are divided into 
three main categories: government intervention in or regulation of business; acts relating to war, 
terrorism, or social unrest; and other acts committed by non-governmental actors. A specific 
political risk effect, however, represents the intervention of a government or other socio-political 
actors. Actors signify the players involved through which a potential political risk may be 
realized. It is therefore important to be familiar with these in order to apprehend why and how a 
potential political risk becomes a realized political risk effect. Actors may include for instance 
host government, foreign state, a terrorist organization, or a multilateral organization, and can be 
divided into five main categories: central, regional, or local host government; rebel/terrorist 
organization; non-governmental activists; other companies; and foreign state or multilateral 
organization. Information on effects and actors, conversely, is not adequate in regards to 
understanding the multidimensionality of political risk. It is also necessary to understand the 
underlying sources of political risk and how they ultimately may affect a mega project. Sources 
may include elements such as political ideologies, company performance, environmental issues, 
foreign policy issues, and corruption, and they can be divided into three major sections: socio-
political instability and grievances; political institutions; and preferences and attitudes. Having 
briefly pointed out the core of the causal framework, the following section, based on existing 
theory and research, will present project and industry specific risks particularly relevant to the 
investigation of this thesis. Firstly, a section dealing explicitly with the oil and gas industry will 
be presented, followed by elements deemed important to oil and gas mega projects, albeit with a 
special emphasis on mega project particulars. 
 
2.3.1 Industry specific risks 
 
There is a consensus in existing theory that the oil and gas industry is particularly vulnerable to 
political risk. But why is it that this industry is so prone to political hazards? Jakobsen (2005) 
points out that because of their need for big, fixed investments and long payback periods, oil and 
gas companies are commonly rather vulnerable to elements such as policy instability, 
intervention by the host government, and the obsolescing bargain mechanism (OBM). Oil and gas 
companies are also vulnerable to government corruption, accusations of unwarranted profits, and 
exploitation of the host country‟s resources (Jakobsen 2005). Natural resource projects, in other 
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words, are faced with an innate organizational vulnerability and “foreign investment in resource 
and infrastructure projects has long been among the most sensitive of all international corporate 
activities” (Moran 1998:70). This is also drawn attention to by Lax (1988) who argues that there 
is an inherent conflict of interest in the organization of foreign investment in oil and that political 
risk can be seen as a result of this conflict.  
 
The OBM refers to the negotiation process between host country and foreign investors where the 
key element is that “initial agreements are reached under terms that subsequently become 
politically obsolete as the respecting bargaining strengths of the actors shift” (Lax 1988:141). 
Important aspects included in the OBM are ownership shares, tax rates, and the size of the 
investment. The outcome to a large depends on the “relative demand for the other‟s resources, as 
well as the stakes at play, the similarity of interests, and bargaining skills.” (Jakobsen 2007:49). 
This is also pointed out by Dicken (2007), and although he is focusing specifically on the 
bargaining relationship between transnational companies (TNCs) and states in general, his 
conclusions can also be seen in relation to oil and gas mega projects in particular. Dicken 
(2007:234) argues that states have the possibility of influencing two key elements that are of vital 
importance to TNCs: “the terms on which TNCs may have access to markets and/or resources” 
and “the rules of operation with which TNCs must comply when operating within a specific 
national territory.” The outcome of the discussions, then, can be seen as a consequence of two 
fundamentals: the cost of the host country‟s economy of losing the investment and the possibility 
of the host country in finding alternatives (Dicken 2007). The bargaining power of the 
counterparts can therefore be regarded as a combination of three essential components: “(1) the 
relative demand for each other‟s resources, (2) the constraints on the actors involved, and (3) 
“the negotiating status of the participants” (Dicken 2007:242). Concerning the relative demand 
for each other‟s resources, it is clear that technology plays an important part. When operating in 
countries where technology and the necessary „know how‟ is lacking, the foreign petroleum 
company is often granted concessions. Technology, therefore, often constitutes a key bargaining 
chip for oil and gas companies (Lax 1988).  
 
With basis in the OBM, one can expect that effects such as tax increase; back-tax claims; breach, 
termination, suspension of contract; and, possibly nationalization, expropriation, confiscation to 
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be well represented in the findings and naturally carried out by the host government. Also, seeing 
that oil and gas are extremely important commodities, one can expect foreign policy issues to be 
a relevant source of political risk. Furthermore, the oil industry is under continuous scrutiny from 
both NGO‟s and governments alike to fulfill certain environmental requirements. Failure to meet 
these requirements can result in negative publicity, fines, and even renegotiation of contract or 
expropriation (at least used as an excuse for such actions, see Sakhalin II in the case analyses 
section). Examples of how environmental disasters and environmental neglect can result in severe 
negative publicity include the recent BP accident in the Gulf of Mexico, Exxon Valdez in 1989, 
the Camisea field in Peru (as pointed out in the case analyses section), and numerous and ongoing 
issues in the Niger Delta in Nigeria. It is difficult to measure, however, the impact that such 
negative attention have upon the project and the firms in charge. Even though the immediate 
effects do not necessarily hamper the project in question, a negative impression might be attached 
to the companies, spurring increased negative attention to future projects. 
 
The oil and gas industry, of course, is also vulnerable to industry wide policy changes and 
preferences and attitudes, with the interrelated phenomena of economic nationalism and political 
ideologies standing out as the two most interesting elements in this regard. Economic nationalism 
is a well-known „problem‟ for the petroleum industry and it was such policies that sparked the 
focus on political risk in the 1970s. The best examples in present time are perhaps Venezuela, 
where the oil and gas industry has been hit hard as a consequence of the policies carried out by 
Hugo Chavez and his government, and Russia, since Vladimir Putin stamped his mark on the 
country (Houllerbergh & Zaslavsky 2004). It is also interesting to include the aspect of 
globalization in this regard. While on the one hand globalization can be seen to bring forth a 
standardization of world affairs, it can arguably also result in the exact opposite. Without going 
into any great detail regarding this debate, it seems fair to argue that in the face of globalization, 
some nations see the need to cement their own identity and preserve their own resources, both 
capital and human, and as a consequence follow a certain national ideology and implement 
certain economic policies (see Sakhalin II in the case analyses section). 
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2.3.2 Project specific risks 
 
As many argue, political risk can be seen as highly project specific (e.g., Frynas 1998; Frynas & 
Mellahi 2003; Kobrin 1979). Project specific risks can be seen as a result of all elements relative 
to a specific project, and features such as location (e.g. onshore vs. offshore), size, complexity, 
management competence, and stakeholders obviously all matter. To briefly review existing 
theory; mega projects are considered to carry high uncertainty and risk and to be physical, 
expensive, public, politicized, scrutinized ventures with a substantial impact upon the local 
environment and community, and a potential for considerable negative publicity, both locally and 
internationally. With basis in these characteristics, it is clear that mega projects, at least 
hypothetically, carry more risk than normally-sized projects. Some specific elements stand out as 
especially applicable.  
 
Seeing that mega projects affect the local community and environment, one can expect 
environmental issues and social unrest to be important sources of political risk. It is of course 
difficult to predict exactly which types of political risk effects this might contribute to, but 
protests/demonstrations, NGO activism, and social unrest are all possible outcomes. The element 
of stakeholders is also interesting in this regard and is well documented in existing literature 
(Aaltonen 2010; Aaltonen, Jaakko & Tuomas 2008; Javernick-Will and Levitt 2010; Pinto 2000). 
A stakeholder can be defined as a person, group, or organization that has an interest in the 
project, either directly or indirectly. Aaltonen, Jaakko & Tuomas (2008:513), in their study of 
stakeholder salience in global projects, argue that the project management is “likely to pay 
attention to and respond to the claims of those stakeholders that they perceive to have more 
salience, which is defined using three attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency.” As a 
consequence of this, they argue, the various stakeholders will seek to increase their salience and 
this may contribute to the afore-mentioned effects. 
 
Stakeholders, of course, are also those actors directly involved in the venture and it is not unusual 
that players from several countries work together on a project. The bigger the project, the more 
stakeholders are likely to be involved, and it is almost inevitable that some disagreements and 
conflicts will occur. What is more, with the increasing strength of state controlled oil companies 
(Energy Intelligence 2009), the various companies‟ home country rules and regulations, along 
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with foreign policy issues, should be treated as a potentially significant factor. Regarding foreign 
policy in particular, building alliances, both politically and economically, is an integral part of 
international politics and engaging in a mega project in the „wrong‟ country can thus have severe 
implications. The power and influence of the US is obvious in this regard. A good example is 
Statoil‟s involvement in the Anaran field in Iran. Iran‟s failure to meet US demands in relation to 
their uranium program resulted in US sanctions against foreign companies involved in oil and gas 
extraction in the Iranian sector. As a result of this pressure, Statoil had to seize its activities on 
the field in 2007. The US is of course both a major player and market in the global oil and gas 
industry. Thus, the sanctions posed upon Statoil would be severe if they had failed to meet US 
demands.
5
 Foreign states, then, can be expected to be a significant actor in regards to the 
realization of political risk effects.  
 
With a classification of mega projects as expensive, public, and politicized ventures, it is also 
likely that political institutions and government intervention are significant elements to consider. 
Rule of law, regulations, level of bureaucracy and corruption, reforms and policy changes are all, 
to a greater and lesser degree, well documented in the existing literature (including Busse & 
Hefeker 2007; Henisz 2000; Wei 2000). The cost and size of a mega project may lead to 
bureaucratic delays, and with vast amounts of money being involved, corruption is a conceivable 
occurrence. What is particularly interesting to draw attention to, however, is the democracy – 
autocracy distinction. A wide range of literature touches upon to the relevance of a democratic 
form of government in relation to foreign direct investment. The bulk of this literature (e.g., 
Busse 2004; Feng 2001; Harms & Ursprung 2002; Jensen 2003; Oneal 1994) conclude that 
democracies provide for a better investment climate and therefore pose less political risk than 
autocracies. The core of the argument, as summed up by Jakobsen (2007) is that well working 
democratically governed countries provide for a stable and predictable environment. One might 
argue, on the other hand, that political risk only constitutes a risk when an unforeseen event 
occurs (Kobrin 1979). Mega projects are increasingly initiated in so-called risky areas but if it is 
predicted and calculated that something will occur, the likelihood that the risk will become 
                                                          
5
 “Usa truer Statoil for virksomhet I Iran,” E24, 26 April 2010, 
<http://e24.no/utenriks/article3623089.ece>, 
“Iran-marerittet vokser for Statoil,” Teknisk Ukeblad, 10 December 2009, <http://www.tu.no/olje-
gass/article231000.ece>. 
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realized is, at least in theory, minimized. An unstable political environment makes it potentially 
very difficult to predict the future, and predicting the future is in effect what political risk 
handling is all about. In theory, then, a stable non-democratic country does not necessarily pose 
any more risk than an unstable democratic country (Li & Resnick 2003; O‟Donnell 1978). This 
statement is obviously somewhat superficial and fails to investigate important underlying 
features. The main point is nevertheless brought forward and it will be paid further attention to in 
the analysis section of this paper.  
 
Regarding government intervention, Makhija (1991:532) provides an interesting rationale, 
arguing that the host government 
 
“pursue specific objectives with respect to multinational firms, either individually or 
collectively across an industry. Whenever information relative to these objectives suggests to 
the government that the objectives are not being furthered, the government is motivated to 
intervene. The manner in which it intervenes (or the type of intervention) is directly related to 
the desired objective. These objectives may be of an economic, social or political nature.” 
 
Although Makhija refers to multinational firms, it is also relevant to petroleum mega projects. 
Jakobsen (2007) is also careful to point out the importance of the political institutions in question, 
arguing that the majority of mass expropriations in the 1960s and 1970s were linked to 
underdeveloped institutional frameworks. The grounds for this presumption are that without a 
proper institutional framework in place, it is easier for influential opportunistic individuals to act 
in their self-interest. Political institutions should thus be regarded as a significant source of 
political risk of oil and gas mega projects. 
 
Having paid attention to the nature of political risk one can expect to experience in connection 
with oil and gas mega projects, three main elements stand out as particularly important: (1) the 
obsolescing bargain mechanism, (2) the need of a social license to operate, and (3) a view of 
mega projects as carriers of high risk and public scrutiny with a substantial impact upon the local 
community and the environment. With main focus on these features, the following hypotheses 
can be made: 
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Hypothesis 1: Oil and gas mega projects are more prone to political risk than other industries. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Non-democratic countries do not carry more political risk for oil and gas mega 
projects than democratic countries.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Government intervention is the most prevalent political risk effect for oil and gas 
mega projects due to the working of the obsolescing bargain mechanism and mega 
projects‟ large size and complexity. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Social unrest is more prevalent for oil and gas mega projects that ventures in other 
industries given the need of a social license to operate.  
 
Hypothesis 5: NGO activism is significant for oil and gas mega projects due to the need of a 
social license to operate.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Political institutions are the most prevalent source of political risk for oil and gas 
mega projects due to the working of the obsolescing bargain mechanism. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Environmental issues are significantly more prevalent as a source of political risk 
of oil and gas mega projects than for ventures in other industries.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Foreign states are significant actors responsible for carrying out political risk for 
oil and gas mega projects. 
 
Based on the theoretical foundation of this study, it is clear that several hypotheses could be 
added to this list. The stated hypotheses, however, comprise the factors one can expect to be of 
most importance and, although some elements have been left out, the analysis section of the 
thesis will touch upon other features drawn attention to by existing theory and research.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This section presents the methodology employed in the investigation of political risk of oil and 
gas mega projects. The section is divided into three sub-sections. Firstly, the method of data 
collection is presented, followed by the operationalization of key terms, and finally 
methodological issues.  
 
3.1. Method of data collection   
 
Jakobsen‟s dataset is based on 330 cases of realized political risk events in developing countries 
between 1998 and 2005. He relied on secondary sources for his data collection and, more 
specifically, two major news journals, namely BBC News Online and The Economist. An 
important element in such a content-analysis endeavor is of course the coding guidelines. Seeing 
that I have not altered Jakobsen‟s approach in this regard, it is necessary to reiterate the most 
important factors behind his categorization. First and foremost it is important to stress that the 
dataset only includes developing countries (based on the definition of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development in 2002), and it also includes economies in transition. 
The fact that Jakobsen relied solely on developing/transitional economies is positive for my 
investigation for two main reasons: (1) as pointed out by Jakobsen, political risk is deemed to be 
most prevalent in the mentioned economies; (2) a vast amount of the world‟s oil and gas reserves 
are located in countries (or areas belonging to countries) with economies that can be deemed 
developing or transitional.  
 
Furthermore, although standard financial theory highlights that risks might entail both 
opportunities and problems for firms, only political risk incidents which negatively affect the 
companies or projects involved are included in the dataset. Regarding more detailed 
specifications, it is also worth mentioning that: (1) threats are included as long as they are 
deemed serious and credible enough; (2) when events causing problems for a company are 
several and bound together in a process, these are counted as one incident; and (3) a so-called 
macro event, where one intervention affects several companies or industries, is recorded as one 
single act, regardless of how many players it affects (Jakobsen 2007). When deemed necessary, 
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Jakobsen relied upon supplementary news media in order to uncover sources of political risk but 
information regarding effects and actors were taken exclusively from BBC News Online and The 
Economist. 
 
Regarding the actual coding process, based on the information from the sources, a specific case 
of political risk is given one code or value. This is the case also if a project or company 
experiences several types of interference, given that they belong to the same fundamental 
process. The reason behind this, of course, is to avoid counting several times an event that to all 
intents and purposes is one and the same occurrence. Regarding sources and actors, on the other 
hand, a different strategy applies. As specifically drawn attention to, a political risk effect is not 
always the result of one specific source carried out by one specific actor. It is rather a 
multidimensional phenomenon; one specific effect can be the result of several actors and sources, 
necessitating the inclusion of multiple actors and sources where applicable. This aspect will be 
drawn closer attention to in the upcoming analysis section. Also, it is important to underline that 
the dataset is informative in regards to “the frequency of a specific intervention relative to other 
kinds of intervention” (Jakobsen 2007:89), but not so much in regards to total frequency or total 
losses (for further information, see Jakobsen 2007, Ch. 4). 
 
Having drawn attention to the methodological implications of Jakobsen‟s system of data 
collection and analysis, the purpose of the following section is to disclose the rationale behind my 
own selection and classification of mega projects as included in Jakobsen. From the outset, one of 
the planned investigations of this study was to compare the political risk of oil and gas mega 
projects with the oil and gas industry in general. Based on Jakobsen‟s dataset, though, 90 out of 
113 cases involving the oil and gas industry are deemed to constitute mega projects. Seeing that 
such a large percentage falls into the category of mega projects, such an analysis is fruitless. The 
objectives of the analysis of this thesis, then, is threefold: (1) to compare oil and gas mega 
projects with political risk across all industries included in Jakobsen; (2) to provide a descriptive 
statistical analysis of political risk in oil and gas mega projects; (3) to provide case studies of 
three oil and gas mega projects with the purpose of identifying the causal mechanism involved, 
and to exemplify how political risk may affect a mega project in practice. 
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There are primarily three reasons for the utilization of Jakobsens dataset for this thesis. The first 
is that it presents a very thorough account of realized political risk events. As commented on 
earlier, the lack of empirical data on political risk is a serious hinder to the development of the 
field; Jakobsens„s study therefore stands out as an important contribution to its progression. The 
second main reason for relying upon his dataset is that the creation of a comprehensive dataset is 
extremely time-consuming. As an alternative to the construction of a far less inclusive dataset for 
this thesis, it is more valuable to utilize an already existing dataset which undoubtedly stretches 
beyond what I would have been able to produce for this thesis. Thirdly, even though the oil and 
gas industry is well represented in his data, there is no special classification of oil and gas mega 
projects. In fact, quantitative analysis of oil and gas mega project in the existing political risk 
literature is, as far as I have uncovered, missing altogether. Drawn from Jakobsen‟s dataset, then, 
a distinct oil and gas mega project dataset is created, consisting of 90 events of realized political 
risk. 
 
Keeping in mind that the analysis is of a descriptive nature, there is no weighing of the different 
incidents, and all events are thus treated equally. This also affects the assessment of the 
hypotheses of this paper, as laid out in Chapter 2. Seeing that the analysis is descriptive, the 
testing of the different hypotheses will not be subjected to the stringency of a regression analysis, 
where a five percent significance level is often employed. They will rather be subjected to a 
qualitative assessment including an evaluation where they are deemed either „supported,‟ „partly 
supported,‟ or „rejected.‟ This obviously means that the robustness of the findings is somewhat 
diminished. Yet, recognizing that the main idea is to establish the causal mechanisms of political 
risk and not to analyze the particular characteristics of each individual event, this is not an 
impediment to the investigation. The study is clearly of a quantitative nature, with the dependent 
variable being realized political risk effects, or event count, while the independent variables are 
the various sources and actors leading up to a realized political risk event.  
 
3.2 Operationalization of key terms 
 
In order to carry out a meaningful empirical analysis, it is necessary to operationalize the key 
concepts into measurable entities. The two main concepts of this thesis are, of course, political 
risk and mega projects. The concept of political risk has, as pointed out earlier in this thesis, been 
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subjected to thorough evaluation, and numerous approaches and definitions exist. Since this 
thesis will draw upon the data of Jakobsen (2007), however, it is necessary to follow his 
definition of political risk as “those events, actions, processes, or characteristics of a socio-
political nature that have the potential to – directly or indirectly – significantly and negatively 
affect the goals of foreign direct investors” (Jakobsen 2007:3-4; emphasis is in the original). For 
the present text, „affect the goals of foreign direct investors‟ can be substituted with „affect the 
goals of an oil and gas mega project.‟  
 
Concerning mega projects, existing theory is, as drawn attention to in Chapter 2, rather 
inconclusive in regards to the establishment of a uniform definition and threshold value. 
Although the approach of Rolstadås and Schiefloe (2010), as specifically pointed out, certainly 
makes sense in relation to investigating mega projects as case studies, it is largely unworkable in 
regards to a larger quantitative analysis. In order to carry out a methodologically viable 
investigation, then, mega projects will have to be classified purely according to their size rather 
than a combination of size and complexity. Project size refers to the costs involved but, as 
pointed out above, a fixed threshold value has not yet been agreed upon. Renowned mega project 
scholar Bent Flyvbjerg is frequently relied upon for a classification of mega project but even 
Flyvbjerg operates with different figures in this regard. Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg & Rothengatter 
(2002:144), however, characterize mega projects as “high investment expenditures of USD $1 
billion and more.” This thesis, too, will rely on USD 1 billion as the threshold value. Such a 
methodological „short cut‟ obviously means that valuable distinctions and project specific 
variables are not included in the equation. Yet, in order to carry out any research in the social 
sciences it is necessary to „cut some corners‟ and make generalizations. Hence, this paper is not a 
negative deviation from the norm, but rather a follower of common practice. Regarding the other 
characteristics of a mega project, it is obviously more difficult to arrive at a specific threshold 
value but it is reasonable to argue that any project surpassing USD 1 billion is so large that it 
automatically fulfills the requirements of being highly public, involving a great deal of 
uncertainty and risk, and having considerable effect on the local environment and community, 
whether positive or negative. It is nonetheless important to point out that the threshold value of 
USD 1 billion is not exclusively followed in regards to each individual case. There are two 
interconnected reasons for this: (1) in certain cases, the exact cost of the project has not been 
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identified and; and, (2) there are different components to mega projects. Even though platforms, 
refineries, flow stations, or pipelines may constitute mega projects in their own right, they do not 
operate in isolation. This means that even though the cost of a pipeline project may be USD 850 
million, which does not meet the required threshold value, it is naturally part of other components 
which combined may add up to more than USD 1 billion. On the basis of the mentioned 
classification, 90 cases of oil and gas mega projects are extracted from Jakobsen‟s dataset, 
forming the basis of the investigation of this paper. Seeing that the 90 cases extracted from 
Jakobsen constitute a substantial amount of his total units of analysis, I have recreated his dataset 
exclusive of these 90 events in order to perform a meaningful comparable analysis. The tables 
and figures of this restructured examination can be found in the appendix of this paper. 
 
3.3 Methodological issues 
 
One of the key issues for this thesis is the utilization of news media for data collection, which 
many argue is valuable (Jakobsen 2007; Henisz & Zelner 2005; Simon 1985). Still, there is a 
debate regarding the applicability of this type of data collection. One of the key concerns 
regarding the use of news journals is obviously the aspect of biased reporting. Molotoch & 
Marilyn (cited in Franzosi 1987) argue that mass media can be seen to reflect the practices of 
those holding the power to control the experience of others. This is an interesting and valid point, 
though ”there is no a priori reason to believe that data collected from newspapers would be less 
valid than other commonly used sources” (Franzosi 1987:7).  
 
One key element in regards to possibly biased reporting is naturally whether or not the 
information is faulty or insufficient (Franzosi 1987). Relying upon BBC News Online and The 
Economist, faulty information is therefore not a great cause of concern, and it is rather 
insufficient reporting, then, that stands out as a potential obstacle. Based on the investigation of 
this thesis, however, it is reason to believe that inadequate reporting do not pose a significant 
problem. The vast majority of oil and gas mega projects involve one or more major companies 
(predominantly based in Europe and North America); one can hence be reasonably confident that 
issues involving these ventures are covered in major news journals like the BBC and The 
Economist. This is especially so given that huge foreign investment projects rarely escape 
attention from the media Franzosi (1987). Considering that mega projects form the units of 
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analysis of this thesis, it seems fair to argue that relevant events have been covered by BBC News 
Online and The Economist and consequently been included in Jakobsen‟s dataset.  
 
Barranco & Wisler (1999) identify four potential problems in relation to utilizing 
newspapers/news journals as a means of data collection and they are worthy of closer 
examination. The first problem relates to the suggestion that news value can be seen as 
proportional to the number of participants involved. Fifty kidnapped workers are more 
newsworthy than one kidnapped worker, but judging from the cases of my analysis where 
numerous events include relatively few people, this is not a major concern. The other 
apprehensions of Barranco & Wisler (304) are “the identity of the news media on news 
selection,” routines of journalists in presenting stories, and “power rather than culture to explain 
the news selection process”. These are all valid concerns and, according to Barranco & Wisler, 
there are primarily two ways to combat such validity issues: select the most renowned or 
comprehensive newspaper, or rely on a number of sources to cancel out possible bias (301). By 
relying upon BBC News Online and The Economist, it is clear that the recommendation of 
depending on renowned news sources is met.  Another important element of this paper is coding. 
Regarding coding guidelines, Franzosi (1987:9) argues three criteria should direct the 
groundwork of a coding scheme when relying upon newspapers and news journals: “(1) 
categories should have a direct link, individually or in a group of other categories, to one or more 
of the hypotheses of interest; (2) categories should be mutually exclusive; and (3) categories 
should maintain a close resemblance to the language used by the newspapers.” These the three 
conditions set by Franzosi for a meaningful utilization of news media as a source of data 
collection are arguably all applicably incorporated.  
 
Another crucial methodological element of this thesis is the selection and classification of mega 
projects as extracted from Jakobsen. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the reasoning behind 
their selection is based on a combination of a set threshold value and a logical broadening of that 
fixed value. Although it is clear that specific elements are being neglected as a result of this 
approach, the case analyses section of this thesis works to address these shortcomings. Based on 
the yielded information, then, it is clear that there are some methodological issues to this thesis, 
but thorough measures have been taken to keep them restricted.  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter will present a descriptive statistical analysis based on the 90 examples of oil and gas 
mega projects extracted from Jakobsen (2007). The complete dataset utilized for this analysis can 
be found in the appendix; only the most relevant tables and figures will be included in this 
section. The purpose of this analysis is twofold: to compare my findings with Jakobsen‟s dataset 
in general, and to evaluate the accuracy of existing mega project- and political risk theory. It is 
important to keep in mind that all references to Jakobsen‟s data are based on my modification of 
his dataset. This modification excludes the 90 cases forming the basis of my investigation: it 
hence consists of 240 cases from the original 330.  Before embarking upon the actual analysis, it 
is useful to briefly draw attention to the content of the altered dataset, so as to make clear what I 
am comparing my findings with. Figure 4.1, as laid out below, shows the distribution by industry 
of the 240 remaining cases of the dataset. „Utilities, transportation, communication‟ is by far the 
biggest component with 29.2 percent but it is worth mentioning that „oil and gas extraction‟ still 
constitutes 9.6 percent of the cases. It is therefore clear that the oil and gas industry formed the 
largest part of the original dataset, lending support to the established theoretical perception that 
natural resource extraction in general, and the oil and gas industry in particular, is especially 
vulnerable to political risk.  
 
Figure 4.1: Industry overview for modified dataset 
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Firstly, it is beneficial to instigate the data analysis by presenting the overview of political risk 
effects by country. An interesting observation is that a vast majority of the listed countries appear 
to be characteristically non-democratic. One explanation to this is that well-working democracies 
are more common in developed countries, which fall outside the units of investigations of this 
thesis. Another striking observation is the fact that Nigeria is represented with 28 cases, 24 of 
which are related to war, terrorism and social unrest. The Nigerian cases hence have a substantial 
effect on the investigation and will be drawn further attention to later in this chapter. 
 
Table 4.1: Political risk events by country 
Country Total Gov. War. Nongov. 
Nigeria  28 3 24 1 
Colombia 8 0 8 0 
Ecuador 6 1 4 1 
Venezuela 6 5 1 0 
Indonesia 5 1 3 1 
Russia 5 5 0 0 
Bolivia 4 3 1 0 
Peru 3 1 1 1 
Yemen 3 0 3 0 
Sudan 3 1 1 1 
Iraq 2 2 0 0 
Kazahkstan 2 2 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 2 1 1 0 
Iran 2 1 0 1 
Afghanistan 1 0 1 0 
Myanmar 1 0 0 1 
Libya/Iran 1 1 0 0 
Lithuania 1 1 0 0 
Sao Tomé & Prin. 1 1 0 0 
Argentina 1 1 0 0 
India 1 1 0 0 
Bangladesh 1 1 0 0 
Pakistan 1 0 0 1 
Ukraine 1 1 0 0 
Falkland Islands 1 1 0 0 
 
Notes: „Total‟ signifies the total amount of political risk effects; „Gov‟ signifies government intervention 
in or regulation of business; „War‟ signifies acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest; and „Nongov‟ 
signifies other acts committed by non-governmental actors. 
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Regarding the question of whether or not non-democratic countries pose more or less risk than 
democratic countries, it is necessary to present a classification of the countries of this study. 
There are several ways of measuring the level of democracy in a country but this thesis relies 
upon Freedom House for its characterization. (The exact methodology employed by Freedom 
House can be found on their web page www.freedomhouse.org.) Freedom House rates countries 
as „free,‟ „partly free,‟ and „not free‟ through a combination of two general sets of characteristics: 
political rights and civil liberties. As with the classification of developing countries from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the information is taken from their 2002 
data, placing it in the center of the investigation of this thesis. With basis in their classification, 
the following table can be made: 
 
Table 4.2: Countries classified by level of freedom (Freedom House, 2002) 
 
Free Partly Free Not Free 
 Bolivia Nigeria Yemen 
 Peru Colombia Sudan 
 Lithuania Ecuador Iraq 
 Sao Tomé & Prin. Indonesia Kazahkstan 
India Russia Saudi Arabia 
Falkland Islands Argentina Iran 
 
 
Bangladesh Afghanistan 
 
Ukraine Myanmar 
 
  
Libya 
 
  
Pakistan 
  
As we can depict from Table 4.2, „not free‟ countries are most prevalent, followed by „partly 
free,‟ and „free‟ countries. The distribution of actual political risk effects, though, does not follow 
the same distribution. „Free‟ countries represent 11 cases (12.2%), „partly free‟ 46 cases (51.1%), 
and „not free‟ 22 cases (36.7%). From this distribution it is clear that „partly free‟ and „not free‟ 
countries constitute far more political risk than free countries; the hypothesis that non-democratic 
countries do not carry more political risk for oil and gas mega projects than democratic countries 
can hence be rejected. What is particularly interesting, though, is that partly free countries 
constitute more than 50 percent of the cases. Although the Nigerian examples make up a majority 
of these, it is nevertheless worthy of a closer examination. Stability can arguably been seen as 
key in this regard. Although Lax (1988) poses that political instability has little impact on foreign 
 
 
- 30 - 
 
oil companies, it seems clear that it indeed does have a marked effect on political risk effects. 
Even though one should be careful in drawing any definite conclusions, one might argue that 
„partly free‟ countries are more unstable than „free‟ and „not free‟ countries, thereby making it 
more difficult to predict the political risk environment of „semi-democracies.‟ This contention, to 
be sure, fits relatively well with other research of the non-linearity of political regime type with 
respect to stability (Gates et al. 2006; Merkel 2008). Having briefly pointed out the distribution of 
political risk events across the relevant countries and highlighted the dissemination in regards to 
political rights and civil liberties, the ensuing sections will focus on the presentation of more in-
depth descriptive analyses, logically divided into categories of effects, actors, and sources. 
 
4.1 Political risk effects 
 
The following figure indicates the distribution of political risk effects along the three main 
dimensions. Constituting 53 percent of the incidents, „acts relating to war, terrorism, or social 
unrest‟ is by far the most common occurrence for oil and gas mega projects, followed by 
„government intervention in or regulation of business‟ with 38 percent, and „other acts committed 
by non-governmental actors‟ with only 9 percent. The hypothesis that government intervention is 
the most prevalent political risk effect for oil and gas mega projects can hence be rejected.  
   
Figure 4.2: Distribution of political risk effects by main dimensions 
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The results from my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset, as laid out in the appendix, shows that 
„government intervention in or regulation of business‟ is the largest component, accounting for 
51 percent of the cases; „acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest‟ accounts for 34 percent; 
while „other acts committed by non-governmental actors‟ adds up to 15 percent. For both sets of 
data, „other acts committed by non-governmental actors‟ constitute by far the smallest 
component. Figure 4.2, of course, only tells us about the distribution along the three main 
dimensions. In order to present a coherent and meaningful analysis, it is also necessary to explore 
the distribution along the sub-categories. The following table shows the dissemination of political 
risk effects across all sub-categories. (For the purpose of an orderly presentation, the five most 
significant variables are highlighted in red and included in a separate table.) For my modification 
of Jakobsen‟s dataset, only the five most significant variables are presented, while the table in full 
can be found in the appendix. 
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Table 4.3: Distribution of political risk effects by sub-categories 
 
            Count          Percentage 
1. Government intervention in or regulation of business 
Breach/termination/suspension of contract or license    9  10.0 
Corporate tax/royalty increases      5  5.6 
Back-tax claims or disputed tax claims      3   3.3 
Bureaucratic/political delays       3  3.3 
Intervention/sanctions by foreign government     3  3.3 
Grand or petty corruption      2  2.2 
Blocking of investment      2  2.2 
Forced or unwanted contract renegotiation/revision/review   2  2.2 
Fine      1  1.1 
Other intervention/policy change/dispute      1  1.1 
Ownership restrictions      1  1.1 
Price controls/tariff freeze/cap on profits      1  1.1 
Regulations/taxes/bans on trade, production, investment, sales   1  1.1 
 
2. Acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest 
Sabotage and terrorism/armed attack      24  26.7 
Kidnapping or hostage taking      15  16.7 
Severe social unrest      4  4.4 
War threat or severe instability and threat to physical safety   3  3.3 
Protests, demonstrations, blockades against company    2  2.2 
 
3. Other acts committed by non-governmental actors 
Potentially detrimental lawsuit/compensation claims related to activism  4  4.4 
NGO activism      3  3.3 
Corruption      1  1.1 
Total:      90  100 
 
Notes: As opposed to sources and actors, there is only one specific effect for one case. The numbers 
presented above are hence accurate and the percentage precise. 
 
Among the five most significant variables, three are unsurprisingly associated with „acts relating 
to war, terrorism, or social unrest‟. Accounting for 24 incidents, or 26.7 percent of total realized 
political risk effects, sabotage is by far the most common occurrence, with the majority being 
sabotage on oil and gas pipelines. The Canon Limon pipeline in Colombia is notorious in this 
respect as it was bombed a record 170 times in 2001. Rebel groups such as the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) demand foreign 
companies to pay taxes so as to avoid rebel violence. The bombings in 2001 occurred as 
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Occidental Petroleum refused to meet the groups to discuss extortion demands.
6
 Kidnapping or 
hostage taking is also an alarmingly common event, with Nigeria and South American countries 
topping the chart. Examples in this regard include the kidnapping of 12 oil workers in Ecuador in 
1999 by a Colombian kidnapping gang which for long had been targeting tourists and foreign 
workers;
7
 and the kidnapping of eight oil workers in 1998 employed by Texaco by militant 
youths (who allegedly wanted oil companies in the area to invest more in local communities) 
belonging to the Ijaw community in the Niger Delta.
8
 The need of a SLO, then, is clearly 
reflected in the type of political risk effects carried out. 
 
Table 4.4: Top 5 effects 
 
            Count       Percentage 
 
Sabotage and terrorism/armed attack      24  26.7 
Kidnapping or hostage taking      15  16.7 
Breach/termination/suspension of contract or license    9  10.0 
Corporate tax/royalty increases      5  5.6 
Severe social unrest      4  4.4 
Potentially detrimental lawsuit/compensation claims related to activism  4  4.4 
 
Note: Seeing that „severe social unrest‟ and „potentially detrimental lawsuit/compensation claims related 
to activism‟ each are represented in 4.4 percent of the cases, both are included in the table. 
 
What is interesting and perhaps somewhat surprising, is that NGO activism only represents 3.3 
percent of the cases and is hence not ranked among the top five effects. Considering that mega 
projects are very public and therefore attract a lot of attention whenever something goes wrong, 
one should expect to see a higher percentage of NGO activism. The reason that numbers are 
relatively low can arguably be seen in connection with the high rate of acts of sabotage and 
kidnapping/hostage taking. It seems fair to argue that if a similar study was undertaken in 
                                                          
6
 “Colombia considers „war tax.” BBC News, 7 March 2002, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1859431.stm> 
7
 “Oil workers freed in Ecuador,” BBC News, 20 December 1999, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/572017.stm>,  
“Colombia busts kidnapping ring,” BBC News, 23 June 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1403616.stm>. 
8
 “Oil workers kidnapped in Nigeria,” BBC News, 11 November 1998, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/212623.stm>, 
“Oil workers in Nigeria released,” BBC News, 17 November 1998, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/216187.stm>. 
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developed countries, the rate of NGO activism would be much higher, while sabotage and 
kidnapping/hostage taking would be much lower. The rationale behind such an argument is 
twofold: (1) people in developing countries do not have the same opportunities to express 
themselves, either through NGO activism or otherwise, as people in the developed world (despite 
being labeled as „free‟ or „partly free‟ by Freedom House, the labels are only generalizations and 
do not account for substantial internal division); (2) poverty, lack of a „trickle-down‟ effect, and 
environmental deprivation lead to desperation which, in combination with point one, may result 
in acts of sabotage and/or kidnapping and hostage taking. Such a view is also supported by 
Garver (2009), who highlights people‟s access to information and means of communication as a 
tool to make their voices heard and, consequently, to increase the capability to raise their degree 
of influence. In support of this proposition, many of the cases involving NGO activism also 
include NGOs based outside of the home country. Good examples are the Camisea gas project 
(see the case analyses section) and Chevron Texaco in Ecuador, a project which was hit with a 
USD 1 billion lawsuit by Ecuadorean Indians in 2003. Backed by several NGOs, including 
Amazon Watch, they accused the company of destroying the rainforest and contaminating rivers 
and streams.
9
 Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are helpful in highlighting the afore-mentioned theoretical 
conception, and the following table indicates the distribution of the 56 cases of „war‟ and „non-
gov‟ effects along the classification of Freedom House. 
 
Table 4.5: Distribution of „war‟ and „non-gov‟ effects by level of freedom 
 
War Non-gov 
Free 2 1 
Partly Free 39 3 
Not Free 6 4 
                                     Number of events       
 
Notes: „Gov‟ signifies government intervention in or regulation of business; „War‟ signifies acts relating 
to war, terrorism, or social unrest; and „Nongov‟ signifies other acts committed by non-governmental 
actors. 
 
                                                          
9
 “Ecuadorean Indians sue Texaco,” BBC News, 8 May 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3009201.stm>, 
“Texaco faces $1b lawsuit,” BBC News, 22 October 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3212698.stm>. 
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As we can see from this table, „partly free‟ countries account for the majority of acts related to 
war, terrorism, or social unrest. Events related to non-governmental actors are rare in all three 
categories, but the difference in distribution is undeniably most prominent in regards to „partly 
free‟ countries. Without going too much in-depth regarding this observation, one might argue that 
countries with a certain degree of freedom are most prone to acts of war, terrorism, or social 
unrest because they are not quite free enough to carry more non-governmental effects, and not so 
authoritarian that any response at all is deemed difficult. It is important to point out, however, 
that a substantial amount of the cases in the „partly free‟ category can be found in Nigeria where 
most of the kidnappings of personnel and hijackings of platforms and flow stations are carried out 
by local groups protesting against a lack of trickle-down effect and environmental degradation.  
 
Other points warranting further examination are „breach/termination/or suspension of contract or 
license‟ and „corporate tax/royalty increases,‟ both of which can be seen as connected to the OBM. 
Recall from Chapter 2 that the OBM refers to the process of negotiation between foreign 
investors and the host country where agreements become obsolete as the bargaining power 
changes. The rationale is that host countries often agree on unfavorable conditions in order to 
attract foreign investment. Once the investment is in place, though, they seek to increase their 
revenue (Jakobsen 2006). This is closely linked with the idea of oil and gas as part of a nation‟s 
patrimony because as soon as the host country recognizes that their national belongings are being 
taken away under unfavorable conditions, the rules will change and the foreign operator may face 
potential risks. Lax (1988) points out that the state plays an assertive role in every important oil 
producing country in that they link oil and gas policies to the wider goals of the state. In order to 
do this, they must also control their own oil and gas resources. This will be drawn further 
attention to through the presentation of Sakhalin II in Chapter 4. Other examples, as included in 
the dataset, are BP in Russia, which in 2005 was hit with a back-tax claim of USD 936 million
10
, 
several industry-wide tax increases in Venezuela in 2001 and 2005,
11
 and the cancellation by the 
                                                          
10
 “TNK-BP gets $936m Russia tax bill,” BBC News, 11 April 2005, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4433517.stm>. 
11
 “To the barricades,” The Economist, 22 November 2001, 
<http://216.35.68.200/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=E1_RSSPVQ>, 
“Chavéz squeezes the oil firms,” The Economist, 10 November 2005, 
<http://www.economist.com/node/5149299>. 
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Iraqi oil ministry of a USD 3.7 billion oilfield development deal at the hand of Russian company 
in 2002.
12
  
 
As regards Table 4.6, compared to the top five effects of the modified dataset, we can see that the 
top three effects are identical. It is still important to take notice of the fact that there are rather 
dramatic differences in regards to percentage. While there is a relatively even distribution among 
the most important effects in Jakobsen‟s data, the distribution in regards to oil and gas mega 
projects is far less dispersed.  
 
Table 4.6: Top 5 effects (my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
            Count      Percentage 
Sabotage and terrorism/armed attack      30  12.5 
Kidnapping or hostage-taking      26  10.8 
Breach/termination/suspension of contract or license    24  10.0 
NGO activism      22  9.2 
War threat or severe instability and threat to physical safety   16  6.7 
 
One possible explanation to the disparity in the data can be that Jakobsen‟s data stretch across a 
number of different industries, leading to a more leveled distribution. Focusing on one specific 
element within one industry, on the other hand, is likely to produce more particular results. What 
is interesting, however, is precisely the fact that the top three effects are identical, suggesting that 
political risk effects for oil and gas mega projects in particular and foreign investment in general 
share many characteristics. To understand how political risk effects become exactly that, though, 
it is necessary to draw attention to the actors through which political risks are realized as well as 
the underlying sources. 
 
4.2         Actors through which political risks are realized 
 
Figure 4.3 points out the distribution of actors by the main dimensions. The most striking 
observation is undeniably the almost indistinguishable elements of „central, regional, or local host 
government‟ and „rebel/terrorist organization.‟ Again, the link to the OBM and the need of a SLO 
                                                          
12
 “Iraq cancels Russian oil deal,” BBC News, 12 December 2002, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2570757.stm>. 
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is evident. Based on the analysis of political risk effects where NGO activism and its related 
sources are not ranked among the most important elements, it is rather unexpected that „non-
governmental activists‟ constitute 28.9 percent of the actors responsible for carrying out political 
risk. It is important to highlight, however, that there can be several different actors involved in 
one specific event, meaning that although non-governmental activists might not very often be 
solely responsible for carrying out realized political risk effects, they are nevertheless a frequent 
contributor.   
 
Figure 4.3: Actors through which political risks are realized by main dimensions 
 
         Number of incidents of political risk effects 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of multiple actors, the total number of registered actors exceeds the number of 
cases in the dataset. The numbers in the figure are in relation to the number of cases (90) in the dataset and 
reflect the count and percentage of cases where the actor in question is regarded as having contributed to a 
realized political risk effect. 
 
When differentiating actors by sub-categories, however, we can see that the main category of 
non-governmental activists includes both „NGO/activists‟ and „local communities/citizens,‟ with 
the latter being the most significant of the two. „Local communities/citizens‟ and „NGO/activists‟ 
can, to all intents and purposes, be seen as a non-violent equivalent to rebel movements and acts 
of terrorism. Classifying all of these incidents as non-violent, however, may be something of an 
exaggeration. Even though they are not labeled as rebels/militants or terrorist, many of these 
33 (36.7%) 
31 (34.4 %) 
26 (28.9 %) 
9 (10%) 
 
4 (4.4%) 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Rebel/terrorist organization
Central, regional, or local host
government
Non-governmental activists
Foreign state or multilateral organization
Other companies
 
 
- 38 - 
 
cases involve rather violent protests and demonstrations, for example in countries like Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Nigeria.
13
 Violent or non-violent, though, the link to the need of a SLO is evident.  
 
Table 4.7: Actors through which political risks are realized by sub-categories  
 
              Count      Percentage 
 
1. Central, regional, or local host government 
Central government      27  30.0 
Political parties/politicians      4  4.4 
Judiciary/police      3  3.3 
Regional/local government       1  1.1 
Military      1  1.1 
 
2. Rebel/terrorist organization 
Rebel movement/militants      29  32.2 
Terrorist organization      2  2.2 
Criminal organization      2  2.2 
      
3. Non-governmental activists 
Local communities/citizens      20  22.2 
NGO/activists      8  8.9 
Worker/labor union      4  4.4 
Shareholders/investors      2  2.2 
 
4. Other companies 
Employee or local/HQ management of own company    3  3.3 
Domestic private partner/supplier/financer/offtaker/customer   1  1.1 
Domestic non-private partner/supplier/financer/offtaker/customer  1  1.1 
 
5. Foreign state or multilateral organization  
Foreign state      9  10.0  
 
Notes: Due to the existence of several actors in certain cases, the total number of registered actors exceeds 
the number of cases (90) in the dataset. The percentages indicated in the figure are in relation to the 
number of cases in the dataset. 
 
As specified in Table 4.8, we can see that „rebel movements/militants‟ and „central government‟ 
stand out as the two most significant actors; followed by „local communities/citizens‟ with 22.2 
percent; in turn followed by „foreign state‟ and NGO/activists‟ with 10 and 8.9 percent 
                                                          
13
 “Bolivia‟s gas fires new movements,” BBC News, 17 October 2004, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3744194.stm>, 
“Compromise on Ecuador oil crisis,” BBC News, 24 August 2005, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4177190.stm>, 
 “Shell declares „force majeure‟ in Nigeria,” BBC News, 9 October 1998, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/189807.stm>. 
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respectively. Regional/local government, on the other hand, only represents 1.1 percent of the 
cases. It is difficult to draw and definite conclusions from this observation but one reason could 
be that regional and local governments in many developing countries are not institutionally strong 
enough to represent any significant risk for oil and gas mega projects. The fact that local 
communities/citizens and „rebel movements/militants‟ are well represented in the data might lend 
some support to this theory, in that local and regional governments are not able to lay the 
groundwork for a well-functioning society. The central government, in many cases, is also not 
able to provide for a stable and functioning society but, as opposed to regional and local 
governments, they hold the power to significantly affect oil and gas mega projects. As 
highlighted in the „effects‟ section, breach, termination, or suspension of contract or license are 
the most common effects in this regard - and the OBM is therefore a key element. 
 
Concerning NGO/activists, the figures from the „effects‟ section show that actual NGO activism 
is of little importance. 8.9 percent of the cases, though, include NGO/activists as an actor 
responsible for carrying out political risk. As will be drawn attention to in the presentation of the 
Camisea gas project in the case analyses section, a possible explanation to this uneven 
relationship can be that NGOs often assist local communities and citizens in their plight to make 
their voices heard. Although NGOs are not often directly involved in the realized political risk 
effects, they are frequently and indirectly assisting organizationally weak groups to raise their 
level of influence. Thus, the hypothesis that NGO activism is significant for oil and gas mega 
projects is at least partly supported.  
 
Another noteworthy observation is that „foreign state‟ appears in 10 percent of the cases, lending 
at least some support to the hypothesis that foreign states are deemed to be a considerable 
contributor to political risk for oil and gas mega projects. Linking back to the theoretical part of 
this thesis, globalization can arguably be seen as a contributory factor, in that mega projects are 
likely to include stakeholders from a variety of different countries. Specific mega project 
characteristics are also significant in this regard, and the growth of mega projects in general can 
also be seen as linked to the process of globalization. Seeing that mega projects are considered to 
carry high public scrutiny, increased risk, and substantial costs, it is clear that the involved 
companies home countries will go to great lengths to protect their investments. This is 
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particularly true for state controlled oil and gas companies. Another important factor, and more 
closely linked to the oil and gas industry in general, is obviously the tremendous economic 
importance of these commodities. Oil and gas is the grease that keeps the wheels of our modern 
civilization running and securing a steady long-term inflow is naturally high up on the agenda for 
most countries. What is more, sanctions and restrictions posed upon some oil producing countries 
also contribute to the importance of foreign states in regards to oil and gas mega projects. 
German company BASF Wintershall‟s involvement in Libya is a good example in this regard. In 
1996, the US enacted a law threatening foreign firms with penalties for investing in Libya. BASF 
Wintershall bid for Libyan oil concessions in 2001 was consequently strongly opposed to by US 
officials. The German company‟s bid was also deemed to threaten US economic interests in the 
region and, seeing that several other foreign companies had escaped US sanctions, it is 
reasonable to argue that this played a major part in the US decision to intervene.
14
 
 
Table 4.8: Top 5 actors 
              Count      Percentage 
 
Rebel movement/militants      29  32.2 
Central government      27  30.0 
Local communities/citizens      20  22.2 
Foreign state      9  10.0 
NGO/activists      8  8.9 
 
As we can see from the results of Jakobsen‟s dataset in Table 4.9, the top five actors are exactly 
the same, although in a different order and with different percentage distributions. Once again, 
then, the similarities between my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset and my own findings are 
notable. Regarding the total number of actors contributing to the realized political risk effects, the 
difference between the two datasets is minimal. For oil and gas mega projects, a total of 117 
actors are recorded, amounting to 1.3 different actors for each case. For my modification of 
Jakobsen‟s dataset, a total of 355 different actors are recorded, amounting to 1.5 actors for each 
case. What we can note from this is that there are less actors contributing to a political risk effect 
for oil and gas mega projects than for ventures in other industries. The difference is so minimal 
however that it does not warrant further investigation. 
                                                          
14
 “BASF faces Libyan sanction fines,” BBC News, 9 May 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1238713.stm>. 
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Table 4.9: Top 5 actors (my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
 
              Count       Percentage 
 
Central government      90  37.5 
Rebel movement/militants      52  21.7 
NGO/activists      31  12.9 
Local communities/citizens      30  12.5 
Foreign state      26  10.8 
 
 
4.3       Sources of political risk 
 
Having drawn attention to realized political risk effects and the actors through which these are 
realized, the next step is to highlight the underlying sources of political risk. By far the most 
prevalent source of risk; „socio-political instability and grievances‟ with 71.1 percent; is followed 
by „political institutions,‟ with 35.6 percent; and „preferences and attitudes‟, with 20.0 percent. 
The hypothesis that political institutions are the most prevalent source of political risk for oil and 
gas mega projects can hence be rejected. 
 
Figure 4.4: Sources of political risk by main dimensions 
 
 Number of incidents of political risk effects 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of multiple sources, the total number of registered sources exceeds the number 
of cases in the dataset. The numbers in the figure are in relation to the number of cases in the dataset (90) 
and reflect the count and percentage of cases where the source in question is regarded as having 
contributed to a realized political risk effect. 
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In fact, the distribution in my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset (as laid out in the appendix) is 
following the exact same configuration, even if with rather different individual characteristics, 
with „socio-political instability and grievances‟ constituting 62.1 percent; „political institutions‟ 
(45.4 percent); and „preferences and attitudes‟ (31.3 percent). Both „political institutions‟ and 
„preferences and attitudes,‟ then, are relatively more common in Jakobsen‟s dataset, while „socio-
political instability and grievances‟ is more important for oil and gas mega projects. Regarding 
the total number of sources, the difference between the two datasets is, as with actors, minimal. 
For oil and gas mega projects, a total of 176 sources are recorded, amounting to 2.0 sources for 
each case. For my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset, a total of 451 different sources are 
recorded, amounting to 1.9 sources for each case. One very important point, however, has to be 
highlighted in relation to this. As opposed to the distribution along the main dimensions, where 
different actors and sources naturally are only registered in relation to a specific case when they 
fall under different main categories, for the calculation of total actors and sources involved, all 
elements are included regardless of whether or not two different sub-categories belonging to the 
same main dimension are recorded in regards to a specific case. It is perhaps somewhat surprising 
that the total number of actors and sources are not higher, but it nevertheless lends support to the 
argument that there are more often than not more than one single source and one single actor 
leading to a realized political risk effect. 
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Table 4.10: Sources of political risk by sub-categories 
 
              Count       Percentage 
 
1. Socio-political instability and grievances 
War/armed conflict or rebel activity      35  38.9 
Local/regional project-specific grievances     28  31.1 
Diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues     9  10.0 
Environmental issues      8  8.9 
Social unrest      8  8.9 
Human-rights issues      5  5.6 
Other      4  4.4 
Religious fervor/grievances      1  1.1 
Worker discontent      1  1.1 
 
2. Political institutions 
Reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns     13  14.4 
Rule of law      8  8.9 
Institutions and laws of foreign country or multilateral organization  7  7.8 
Corruption and cronyism      6  6.7 
Laws, regulations, and bureaucracy      4  4.4 
Authoritarianism       3  3.3 
Decentralized or disputed authority      1  1.1 
         
3. Preferences and attitudes 
Economic nationalism and anti-foreign sentiments    17  18.9 
Political ideologies      2  2.2 
Vested business interests      2  2.2 
 
Host country macroeconomic/financial performance    2  2.2 
 
Company performance      12  13.3 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of several actors in certain cases, the total number of registered actors exceeds 
the number of cases in the dataset. The percentages indicated in the figure are in relation to the number of 
cases in the dataset. 
 
As expected by the distribution along the main dimensions, two of the most significant sub-
categories can be found under „socio-political instability and grievances,‟ namely „war/armed 
conflict or rebel activity‟ and „local/regional project-specific grievances,‟ with the latter being 
most heavily linked with mega projects in accordance with existing theory. It is obviously 
difficult to identify the exact reasons why people engage in conflict. Some general explanations 
can nonetheless be attempted. Jakobsen (2007) identifies two explanations, namely grievance and 
greed. The grievance explanation sees conflict as caused by feelings of injustice amongst certain 
sections of society. Elements such as economic inequality, political or ideological subjugation, 
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and ethnic and religious divisions are considered to be prime causes of many armed conflicts 
(Ellingsen 2000 and Cederman & Girardin 2007). The grievance explanation, though, is 
challenged by scholars such as Piazza (2006) and de Soysa (2002). The greed explanation, on the 
other hand, supported by Ross (2004) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004), sees conflict as the result of 
“economic opportunities or motivations” (Jakobsen 2007:60). It is clear that the oil and gas 
industry carries great wealth creation but the question, of course, is where the money ends up.  
Examples from Nigeria show that the local communities in the Niger Delta benefit little from the 
region‟s vast oil and gas industry, and their anger and frustrations is consequently turned towards 
the local government as well as against the foreign oil companies, resulting in armed attacks and 
rebel activity.
15
 These two explanations arguably do not fully account for the great complexity 
and the wide range of possible sources of conflict. It is also unreasonable to expect that it is 
simply either grievance or greed that causes clashes. They should, therefore, be regarded as very 
general characteristics, and a combination of the two is perhaps what best explains the broad 
reasons behind a conflict. What is clear, nonetheless, is that the need of a SLO is evident also 
through the underlying sources of political risk.  
 
The fact that „local/regional project-specific grievances‟ accounts for a noteworthy 31.1 percent 
of the cases, lends support to the notion, as pointed out in Chapter 2, that the political risks of 
mega projects is highly project-specific, and that such ventures carry high risk and public 
scrutiny. Included in „local/regional project-specific grievances‟ are cultural issues and a good 
example of the effects a lack of cultural understanding may have upon a mega project is US firm 
Occidental Petroleum‟s involvement in the Samore field in eastern Colombia. The field is home 
to the U‟wa tribe who strongly objected to the development of the field, believing “that their 
lands are the heart of Mother Earth, and oil her blood.”16 Members of the tribe forcefully argued 
that the project would kill their culture. Threatening to commit mass suicide if the development 
went ahead, the U‟wa tribe played a major role in the decision of Occidental Petroleum to 
                                                          
15
 “Nigerian protesters seize Shell helicopters,” BBC News, 8 October 1998, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/188561.stm>, 
 “Shell evacuates Nigerian oil terminal,” BBC News, 1 February 1999, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/269802.stm>, 
 “Nigerian army warns oil rebels,” BBC News, 28 September 2004, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3695990.stm>. 
16
 “Indians, oil and the Internet,” The Economist, 4 June 1998, 
<http://www.economist.com/node/132496>. 
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eventually pull out of the project in 1998. The most striking examples of „local/regional project-
specific grievances,‟ however, can undoubtedly be drawn from the Niger Delta, examples of 
which have been presented throughout this chapter. 
 
What is eye-catching is that „company performance‟ constitutes a significant 13.3 percent of the 
events. Included in company performance are elements such as profits, prices, underinvestment 
and contract specifications, and it can hence be linked to the OBM. A good example of „company 
performance‟ is Ecuador in 2005, where existing contracts were deemed unfair and as a 
consequence of this, the President wanted to increase profits from 20 to 50 percent.
17
 On a 
different note, it is also interesting to see that diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues are 
represented in 10 percent of the cases, giving at least some support to the notion that foreign 
policy issues are regarded as being an important source of political risk for oil and gas mega 
project.    
 
Table 4.11: Top 5 sources  
 
              Count       Percentage 
 
War/armed conflict or rebel activity      35  38.9 
Local/regional project-specific grievances     28  31.1 
Economic nationalism and anti-foreign sentiments    17  18.9 
Reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns     13  14.4 
Company performance      12  13.3 
 
Compared to the findings of my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset, three of the same sub-
categories can be identified, but there is nevertheless a marked difference between the two. 
„War/armed conflict or rebel activity‟ is by far the most significant source, accounting for 25.8 
percent of the events, while „rule of law,‟ „diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues‟, and 
„vested business interests‟ are specific for the revised dataset. As with political risk effects, the 
distribution, besides „war/armed conflict or rebel activity,‟ of sources in Jakobsen‟s dataset is also 
rather even. This is arguably a result of several industries being represented, equaling the 
distribution across the different sources. Concerning the suggestion that environmental issues and 
social unrest are significantly more prevalent for oil and gas mega projects than for ventures in 
                                                          
17
 “Ecuador to renegotiate oil deals,” BBC News, 8 September 2005, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4224906.stm>. 
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other industries, the findings do not support this hypothesis. As indicated in Table 4.10, 
environmental issues are represented in 8.9 percent of the cases of oil and gas mega projects 
while Table A9, (in the appendix), shows that 7.5 percent of ventures in other industries include 
environmental issues. The hypothesis that environmental issues are significantly more prevalent 
as a source of political risk for oil and gas mega projects than for ventures in other industries can 
hence be rejected. 
 
Regarding social unrest, the figures are 7.5 percent and 5.4 percent respectively. It is nevertheless 
important to point out that social unrest is differentiated from elements such as rebel activity and 
armed conflict. Also, for political risk effects, where the figures are 4.4 percent and 2.9 percent 
respectively, it is distinguished from elements such as kidnapping, armed attack, and sabotage. 
Although existing theory has not specifically pointed out what social unrest represents, it is 
reasonable to make a distinction between features such as war, protests, and general social unrest. 
Regardless of whether or not social unrest is treated as a general term or divided into more 
specific categories, though, the findings support the hypothesis that social unrest is a more 
prevalent risk for oil and gas mega projects than for ventures in other industries.  
 
Table 4.12: Top 5 sources (my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
              Count      Percentage 
 
War/armed conflict or rebel activity      62  25.8 
Rule of law      37  15.4 
Diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues     36  15.0 
Company performance      30  12.5 
Reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns     29  12.1 
Vested business interests      29  12.1 
 
Note: Seeing that „reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns‟ and „vested business interests‟ each are 
represented in 12.1 percent of the cases, both are included in the table. 
 
4.4         Data excluding the Nigerian examples 
 
As drawn attention to in the introductory part of this chapter, it is clear that the Nigerian 
examples may have a substantial impact on the results of the analysis. It is therefore interesting to 
see how the results would look like if the Nigerian political risk events are excluded. Even though 
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they warrant inclusion in effect of being realized political risk events, seeing that they all stem 
from the same country, and indeed also the same region (the Niger Delta), they do pose a concern 
in the sense that they may limit the generalizability of the results. In any case, it is potentially 
valuable to see what the data will look like without their influence. The hypotheses of this thesis 
will not be specifically drawn attention to in this segment but they will be included in a table in 
the forthcoming discussion section. While tables denoting the sub-categories can be found in the 
appendix, Table 4.13 herein indicates the distribution along the main dimensions. 
 
Table 4.13: Data excluding the Nigeria examples 
 
                      Percentage 
 
Effects          
Government intervention in or regulation of business      50.0 
Acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest       38.7 
Other acts committed by non-governmental actors      11.3 
 
Actors 
Central, regional or local host government       45.2 
Rebel/terrorist organization         29.0 
Non-governmental activists         25.8 
Foreign state or multilateral organization       12.9 
Other companies           6.4 
 
Sources          
Socio-political instability and grievances       66.1 
Political institutions         45.2 
Preferences and attitudes         29.0 
Company performance          21.0 
Host country macroeconomic/financial performance        4.8 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of several actors and sources in certain cases, the total number of registered 
actors and sources exceeds the number of cases in the dataset. The percentages indicated are in relation to 
the number of cases in the dataset excluding the Nigerian examples (62). 
 
As indicated in the table, there are some significant changes in the distribution along the main 
dimensions with the exclusion of the Nigerian examples. In regards to effects, „acts relating to 
war, terrorism and social unrest‟ is no longer the most important element and, as with my 
modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset, government intervention is now by far the most relevant 
factor. In regards to actors, we can see that „central, regional or local host government‟ has 
replaced „rebel/terrorist organization‟ as the most prevalent main dimension; it is now by a long 
way the most important category. Regarding sources, the main characteristics remain unchanged 
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but the percentage distribution is very different. „Socio-political instability and grievances‟ is still 
the most important factor but the proportional importance of „political institutions‟ and 
„preferences and attitudes‟ has increased and moved towards the characteristics of my 
modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset. What we can note from the distribution along the main 
categories, then, is the increasing influence and importance of government intervention and 
political institutions, which is in line with existing theoretical perceptions. The reason for this is 
obviously that 24 out of the 28 Nigerian examples fall into the category of „acts related to war 
terrorism, or social unrest,‟ examples of which have been provided throughout this chapter. What, 
then, are the most significant results in regards to the sub-categories? (Note that all tables 
presenting the distribution of political risk along the sub-categories can be found in the 
appendix.) 
 
Concerning effects, „sabotage and terrorism/armed attack‟ is still by far the most prevalent 
component, represented in 24.2 percent of the cases. Elements related to the OBM have increased 
in importance while „kidnapping and hostage-taking‟ has diminished. This is, as mentioned 
earlier, undeniably linked to the fact that many of the Nigerian cases involve exactly kidnapping 
and hostage-taking. In relation to actors, „central government‟ has replaced „rebel 
movement/militants‟ as the most frequent element, being present in 38.7 percent of the cases. 
Regarding sources, the most eye-catching difference is arguably the fact that „local/regional 
project-specific grievances‟ has gone down from 31.1 percent to a meager 11.3 percent. It is 
therefore clear that project-specific risks is some cases can be seen as linked to the need of a 
SLO, seeing that the Nigerian examples are concerned with issues such as sabotage, kidnapping, 
and severe social unrest. In addition, „diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues‟ is introduced 
as a new highly significant source of political risk, giving support to the idea of oil and gas as 
vital commodities in the international political economy. The fact that mega projects often 
include stakeholders from a number of different countries pursuing their own interests can also be 
seen as a contributory factor in this regard. On a general note, then, the OBM and the need of a 
SLO, continue to stand out as the key elements. Also, with the exclusion of the Nigerian 
examples, political risk for oil and gas mega projects, as compared with foreign investment in 
general appears less disparate than what was asserted by the initial analysis, and more in line with 
existing theory than with the conclusions of the original investigation.  
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4.5     Discussion  
 
Having drawn attention to political risk along the structure of the causal framework, pointed out 
key distributary elements of political risk for oil and gas mega projects, presented a comparison 
to Jakobsen‟s general findings, and provided a brief overview of the discoveries excluding the 
Nigerian examples, this section will discuss the relevancy of the conclusions and link them back 
to the hypotheses posed earlier in this paper. To briefly recapitulate the discussion presented in 
Chapter 2, general political risk theory pays foremost attention to the importance of government 
intervention and the possible consequences of its actions. Regarding oil and gas mega projects in 
particular, this thesis has previously drawn attention to the fact that empirical analysis is lacking. 
Mega project theory in general, on the other hand, is rather consistent in its emphasis on elements 
such as increased risk, public scrutiny, and perhaps most importantly, their need of a so-called 
social license to operate. Regarding the oil and gas industry in general, the OBM stand out as a 
key factor and existing theory is rather uniform in its hypothesis that the industry is especially 
vulnerable to political risk events. These three elements: (1) the view of mega projects as carriers 
of increased risk, complexity, and scrutiny; (2) the need of a social license to operate; and (3) the 
importance of the obsolescing bargain mechanism have been repeatedly touched upon throughout 
the analysis of this thesis. It is hence clear that, as principal explanatory tools, they constitute the 
most important aspects of existing literature. 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, political risk is a multidimensional phenomenon where the road 
from source to effect is not always easily identified. Seeing that the three afore-mentioned 
characteristics play such a significant part, however, it is useful to attempt a categorization of the 
coding scheme along these main dimensions. Even though such a classification might appear 
artificial given the wide variety of effects, actors, and sources included, the vast amount of data 
presented in this chapter will certainly appear more intelligible with the utilization of such an 
approach. A majority of the sub-categories of „government intervention in or regulation of 
business;‟ „central, regional, or local host government;‟ and „political institutions‟ can arguably 
be linked to the OBM, notwithstanding the important element of foreign policy issues and how 
oil and gas can be utilized as a powerful tool in this regard.  
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Regarding the need of a SLO, the majority of the categories included in „acts related to war, 
terrorism, or social unrest;‟ „other acts committed by non-governmental actors;‟ „rebel/terrorist 
organization;‟ „non-governmental activists;‟ and „socio-political instability and grievances‟ can 
largely be seen as connected to this important component of political risk for oil and gas mega 
projects. Mega project characteristics, on the other hand, are more difficult to relate to specific 
categories. Although „other companies‟ and „foreign state or multilateral organization‟ to a 
certain degree can be seen as linked to features such as an increased number of stakeholders and 
increased cost, it is clear that mega projects specifics influence the majority of the elements of 
this analysis and are therefore best perceived as a factor that reinforces the importance of the 
OBM and the need of a SLO. The answer to such a theory, however, can only be tested by 
carrying out a comparative analysis of political risk for oil and gas mega projects compared to 
normally-sized oil and gas projects. 
 
Having attempted to classify the many elements of this thesis into a broader level of 
categorization, the next step is to focus specifically on the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. For 
the purpose of a practical presentation of the conclusions to the hypotheses of this thesis, they are 
re-introduced and subsequently placed in a table deeming them supported, partly supported, or 
rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Oil and gas mega projects are more prone to political risk than other industries. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Non-democratic countries do not carry more political risk for oil and gas mega 
projects than democratic countries.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Government intervention is the most prevalent political risk effect for oil and gas 
mega projects due to the working of the obsolescing bargain mechanism and mega 
projects‟ large size and complexity. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Social unrest is more prevalent for oil and gas mega projects that ventures in other 
industries given the need of a social license to operate.  
 
Hypothesis 5: NGO activism is significant for oil and gas mega projects due to the need of a 
social license to operate.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Political institutions are the most prevalent source of political risk for oil and gas 
mega projects due to the working of the obsolescing bargain mechanism. 
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Hypothesis 7: Environmental issues are significantly more prevalent as a source of political risk 
for oil and gas mega projects than for ventures in other industries.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Foreign states are significant actors responsible for carrying out political risk for 
oil and gas mega projects. 
 
Table 4.14: Conclusion to hypotheses 
            Including the Nigerian examples   Excluding the Nigerian examples 
Hypothesis Supported 
Partly 
supported 
Rejected Hypothesis Supported 
Partly 
supported 
Rejected 
1 X 
  
1 X 
  
2 
  
X 2 
  
X 
3 
  
X 3 X 
  
4 X 
  
         4 X 
  
5 
 
X  5 
 
X  
6 
  
X 6 
  
X 
7 
  
X 7 
  
X 
8  X 
 
8  X 
 
 
As we can see from Table 4.14, the conclusion to the hypotheses including the Nigerian examples 
is: 2 supported, 2 partly supported, and 4 rejected. With the exclusion of the Nigerian examples, 
the distribution is: 3 supported, 2 partly supported, and 3 rejected. Taken at face value, these 
findings suggest that there might be significant shortcomings in the existing political risk- and 
mega project theory. On the other hand, the notion that the oil and gas industry is more prone to 
political risk than other industries is well supported and in line with existing theory and research. 
But what about mega projects in particular? Although 90 cases of political risk for oil and gas 
mega project have been extracted from Jakobsen‟s dataset it is clear that the remaining cases of 
the dataset include mega projects in other industries. It is therefore difficult to propose any 
definite conclusions in regards to mega projects in particular. On a general note, however, 27 
percent (90 out of 330 cases) of political risk incidents fall into the category of oil and gas mega 
projects, lending support to the perception that oil and gas mega projects are particularly 
vulnerable to political risk. The hypothesis that non-democratic countries are associated with 
more political risk for oil and gas mega projects than democratic countries, on the other hand, do 
not carry weight. It is clear, though, that I have simply scraped the surface of such a postulation, 
and that more stringent research must be carried out in order to uncover the robustness of such a 
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claim. As far as government intervention is concerned, with the exclusion of the Nigerian 
examples it constitutes the most important political risk effect for oil and gas mega projects and 
ventures in other industries alike, and it is clear that the nation state apparatus continues to play a 
significant role in the world economy despite the globalization of world affairs. Political 
institutions, although not as important as proposed at the outset, do indeed represent a significant 
source of political risk. The considerable importance of the need of a SLO obviously affects the 
relative importance of political institutions and is arguably the main reason as to why political 
institutions are not the most prevalent source of political risk for oil and gas mega projects. 
 
As regards the hypothesis that social unrest in more prevalent for oil and gas mega projects than 
for ventures in other industries, the data are in support of this notion both including and excluding 
the Nigerian examples. Not classified as social unrest in this paper but nevertheless of great 
interest, a rather surprising finding is the large proportion of sabotage, kidnapping and armed 
attack. Even when excluding the Nigerian examples, such incidents rate among the most 
prevalent political risk effects for oil and gas mega projects. It is rather startling that existing 
theory has not paid particular attention to these elements, especially considering that they are 
integral components to the need of a SLO. The reasons as to why they occur so frequently have 
been touched upon in the grievance and greed discussion earlier in this chapter. To briefly 
recapitulate, they can be seen as a consequence of feelings of injustice and neglect by the local 
community, combined with their lack of other means to increase their salience. Also, mega 
project characteristics such as increased impact upon the local society and environment suggest 
that smaller projects would be less vulnerable to actions related to the need of a SLO.  
 
With basis in existing theory that oil and gas mega projects are deemed to have a substantial 
impact upon the local society and environment, it was expected that NGO activism would be of 
special importance. Although environmental issues can be considered to be of some importance 
(represented in 8.9 percent of the cases including Nigeria and 9.7 percent excluding Nigeria) it is 
not significantly more so than in my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset. The reason for this is 
arguably that industries such as mining, forestry, and oil and gas extraction (even excluding the 
90 cases of mega projects) are well represented in Jakobsen‟s dataset (see Table 4.1). The 
importance of NGO/activists as actors through which political risks are realized is very similar to 
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that of environmental issues as a source of political risk. It is hence reasonable to argue that the 
two are closely related. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the relevancy of NGO activism as a 
political risk effect, on the other hand, is far less than that of NGO/activist as actors. As 
previously drawn attention to, a potential explanation to this lack of correlation might be that 
NGOs frequently help local citizens in raising their salience despite not always being directly 
involved in the realized political risk effects. 
 
Regarding foreign states as significant actors, the findings lend at least some support to this 
proposition. Similarly, foreign policy issues are also a frequent contributor to political risk for oil 
and gas mega projects. The fact that mega projects often include stakeholders from a number of 
different countries arguably contributes to this outcome. The importance of globalization should 
therefore not be underestimated. Also, considering that mega projects represent a significant 
investment, it is clear that the various companies home countries seek to protect their investment. 
Oil and gas is also the world‟s single most important commodity, of which countries are willing 
to go to great lengths to secure a steady supply. Furthermore, some countries are subjected to 
embargos and restrictions by other states (usually the US), which may result in sanctions against 
any foreign investment in the given countries. Although not specific for oil and gas mega 
projects, it nevertheless poses a potentially significant source of political risk. 
 
Due to the multidimensionality of political risk it is very difficult to unveil whether or not the 
realized political risk effects occur as a result of being mega projects, oil and gas mega projects, 
simply oil and gas investment, or a combination of these. On the one hand, it is clear that the oil 
and gas industry in itself is more than capable of causing great distress for local communities and 
the environment but seeing that the oil and gas industry often manifests itself through mega 
projects, and considering the proposition that these have the potential of bringing forth even 
greater scrutiny, it is reasonable to argue that oil and gas megaprojects are indeed more prone to 
political risk than oil and gas investment in general and mega projects of other industries. The 
following chapter, however, will attempt to address the issue of identifying the exact causal 
mechanisms at play through the investigation of three specific oil and gas mega projects, two of 
which are included in the dataset of this thesis. 
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CHAPTHER 5: CASE ANALYSES 
 
This section will present three examples of oil and gas mega projects with the purpose of 
illustrating the conceptual framework and to establish the causal mechanisms at play. The three 
mega projects in question are Sakhalin II in Russia, Mazeikiu Nafta in Lithuania and the Camisea 
gas project in Peru. Both Mazeikiu Nafta and the Camisea gas project are included in the dataset 
of this thesis, while the realized political risk effects in regards to Sakhalin II occurred after the 
finalization of Jakobsen‟s dataset. The reason for choosing exactly these projects is that they 
represent some of the most important aspects drawn attention to in this thesis, including the 
OBM, the need of a SLO, and the view of mega projects as carriers of high risk and public 
scrutiny. They also represent the great impact mega projects are deemed to have on the local 
community and environment, as well as geopolitical aspects. The information provided will 
naturally be of a somewhat superficial manner as each of the three cases warrant substantial 
investigation in their own regard, but it is nevertheless valuable in regards to presenting the 
causal mechanisms at play. 
 
5.1 Sakhalin II 
 
Located in the subarctic environment on and off Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East, Sakhalin 
II is one of the world‟s biggest integrated oil and gas projects. Phase 1 involved oil production 
from the Molkpaq offshore platform, while Phase 2 comprised the installation of two more 
platforms, 1100 kilometers of pipelines, a processing facility, an oil export terminal, and the 
building of Russia‟s first liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant (Sakhalin Energy 2006a,18) 
Furthermore, Sakhalin II was also the only big energy project in Russia that did not include a 
Russian firm; it was initially operated by Shell (55%), Mitsui (25%), and Mitsubishi (20%).
19
 
Figure 5.1 shows the causal framework of political risk with respect to Sakhalin II, and it is 
followed by a description of the project, explaining the components of the framework.  
 
 
                                                          
18
 “After Sakhalin,” The Economist, 13 December 2006, <http://rss.economist.com/node/8413089>. 
19
 “Japan warns Russia over Sakhalin,” BBC News, 19 September 2006, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5358820.stm>. 
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Figure 5.1: Causal Framework for Sakhalin II 
 
Risk Insurance 
Risk Assessment Companies 
 
OBM   
Foreign Policy Issues                     Central Host Government                         NGO Activism 
Environmental Issues                     Non-governmental Activists  Government Intervention 
Political Institutions                       Local activists           Protests 
Preferences and Attitudes            
   
Extremely complex 
  Offshore 
  First project in Russia without domestic partner (initially). 
 
In 1994, when the original deal was negotiated, Russia was enduring a period of transformation 
both politically and economically, which ensured that Shell could enter the project under very 
favorable conditions (Rutledge 2004,
20
). The terms of the initial production sharing agreement 
was that the Russian government would not have any financial gain from the project until the 
developers had recouped their losses. With the costs of the project continually increasing, it 
would be long before the Russian government received any revenue.
21
 In fact, following the 
„normal‟ cost overruns that frequently plague mega projects, (Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg, & 
Rothengatter 2002), total costs amounted to around USD 20 billion. With the coming to power of 
Vladimir Putin in 2000, however, the nature of the Russian petroleum industry changed 
dramatically and the oligarchic capitalism that reigned during the Yeltsin era was brought to a 
halt (Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky 2004). With the change of power, Russia arguably started to see 
the vast oil and gas reserves as a major political tool in a relatively scant tool box. Gaining 
control of Russian oil and gas fields became a priority and preferential treatment of state-
controlled companies like Gazprom thus seemed inevitable.
22
  
  
Regarding environmental issues, the area where construction took place was relatively unspoiled 
and a great number of rivers and streams were affected by the necessary onshore infrastructure. 
                                                          
20
 “After Sakhalin,” The Economist, 13 December 2006, <http://rss.economist.com/node/8413089>, 
“Don‟t mess with Russia,” The Economist, 13 December 2006, 
<http://www.economist.com/node/8413048/>. 
21
 “New deadline for Sakhalin project,” BBC News, 26 September 2006, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5382450.stm>. 
22
 “After Sakhalin,” The Economist, 13 December 2006, <http://rss.economist.com/node/8413089>. 
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Also, the waters surrounding Sakhalin Island are home to a substantial population of grey whales. 
The grey whale issue, together with the project‟s possible effect on local rivers and streams, was 
a cause for great concern among NGOs like the World Wide Fund for Nature and Sakhalin 
Environment Watch, which repeatedly drew attention to the negative impact of the project in this 
regard.
23
 During the course of the project the Russian government argued that certain 
environmental standards were not met.
24
 As a consequence of this they threatened to suspend 
licenses and pursue criminal action against the Shell led consortium.
25
 The result of this quagmire 
was that in 2006, the Russian government, through Gazprom, attained a majority stake in the 
project.
26
 The current shareholding structure is the following: Gazprom (50% plus 1 share), Shell 
(27.5%), Mitsui (12.5%), and Mitsubishi (10%) (Sakhalin Energy 2006b).  
 
Based on the policies of the Putin government, it is reason to believe that the Russian government 
would have sought a controlling stake in Sakhalin II regardless of Shell‟s failure to meet the 
environmental demands set by the Russian Federal Service for the Supervision of Natural 
Resources.
27
 One might indeed argue that the non-governmental activists merely provided 
Moscow with a pretext for intervening. Seeing that “energy remains almost the only powerful 
policy instrument at the disposal of the Russian government that secures Russia‟s position as an 
international power” (Nore n.d.), it seems clear that that the Russian government was, and still is, 
“willing to sustain a reputational loss and pay a high risk premium in order to capture control of 
energy assets” (Thornton 2007:15). Combined with a rapid increase in oil and gas prices, 
Sakhalin II was always going to be in a dangerous position. „Unfulfilled‟ environmental 
standards, then, was arguably only a poorly disguised reason for carrying out this practice. 
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Lending support to this notion is that as soon as the Russian government gained control of the 
project, the environmental problems were no longer an issue.
28
  
 
So could Shell have done anything different in order to avoid what happened? This is of course a 
very difficult question, and no definite answer can be given. One might argue that Shell should 
have known that their extremely advantageous agreement would eventually backfire and that 
precautions should have been made in relation to this. Also, parts of the local community on the 
island expressed dissatisfaction with what they regarded as a lack of positive ripple effects from 
the project,
29
 but this received little media attention and was completely overshadowed by the 
focus on environmental degradation and the subsequent Gazprom takeover. Yet, an essential 
question to pose is if the events of Sakhalin II came about as a result of specific mega project 
characteristics? Would the Russian government have intervened if Sakhalin II was far less 
complex, and with far less importance to the region and Russia as a whole? It is of course 
difficult to present definite answers to these questions. However, based on the information 
provided it is reasonable to argue that in effect of being one of the world‟s biggest integrated oil 
and gas projects, with the considerable local and national effects this carry, and with Russia‟s 
focus on its oil and gas reserves as a paramount economic sector and important geopolitical tool, 
a prestigious project like Sakhalin II was simply too big and too important not to be in full 
control of. The importance of the project can also be seen through the fact that Sakhalin Energy‟s 
LNG plant holds a 5 percent share of total world production and that the project has a massive 
effect on the residents on Sakhalin Island. The unemployment rate on the island dropped to 1.2 
percent in 2007; during construction, moreover, a total of 25.000 people, of which 70 percent 
were Russians, worked on the project.  
 
Relating back to the key elements of this paper, it is clear that the OBM played a major part in the 
realized political risks of Sakhalin II. Preferences and attitudes, along with foreign policy issues, 
though, should also be considered as significant sources. It is important as well to emphasize that 
the project truly is mega, not only in relation to its size, but also in regards to its complexity, 
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number of stakeholders, and public attention. A smaller, less complex and less important project 
would not necessarily tick the boxes in the Russian „game plan‟ but a mega project like Sakhalin 
II was always going to be in a dangerous position.  
 
5.2 Mazeikiu Nafta 
 
Mazeikiu Nafta constitutes a very interesting example and it has been subjected to substantial 
controversy ever since Lithuania‟s declaration of independence in 1992. In the aftermath of the 
country‟s independence, the oil industry naturally went through dramatic changes. It was initially 
split into three sectors: the oil refinery Mazeikiu Nafta, the oil terminal Klaipedos Nafta, and the 
oil pipeline Naftotiekis. In 1995, however, these fractions were reorganized into a joint-stock 
company titled AB Mazeikiu Nafta (Pasukeviciute & Roe 2005). As with Sakhalin II, the 
following figure presents the causal framework of political risk as it relates to this specific 
project, and it is followed by a description of the project, explaining the components of the 
framework.   
Figure 5.2: Causal framework for Mazeikiu Nafta 
 
Risk Insurance 
Risk Assessment Companies 
                                                                 
 
Foreign Policy Issues       Foreign State   Blocking of Investment 
Preferences and Attitudes               Other Companies                             Sanctions by foreign gov. 
Political Institutions                        Central Government          
            
 
  Only refinery in the Baltic States 
  Reliant on Russia for oil and gas inflow 
 
Following the creation of the joint-stock company, a succession of attention-grabbing events 
unfolded. In 1999, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus signed amendments to the oil 
privatization law enabling foreign actors to take up ownership in the company (Pasukeviciute & 
Roe 2005). American company Williams International and Russian company Yukos both sought 
to buy a stake, but it was eventually Williams International that got involved and became a 33% 
owner and operator of Mazeikiu Nafta (Orlen Lietuva 2011). Following the sale to Williams 
International there was opposition to the deal from segments of the Lithuanian society and from 
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the Russian oil company Lukoil. The former led to delays in completing the deal while the latter 
was responsible for ongoing oil supply deficiencies (Zashev 2004). 
 
Before long, though, Williams International experienced some financial difficulties and they 
ultimately reached a 10-year oil supply deal with Yukos. In 2002, the Lithuanian Government, 
Williams International, and Yukos came to an agreement where Yukos attained a 26.85% stake in 
Mazeikiu Nafta. Furthermore, later in 2002, Yukos acquired an additional 26.85% and 
consequently assumed “all rights and obligations of Williams International under the 1999 
agreements with the Lithuanian Government including operator rights in Mazeikiu Nafta” (Orlen 
Lietuva 2011). The fate of Yukos, of course, is well-known and the company was ultimately 
broken up as a consequence of erratic back-tax claims by the Russian government. This naturally 
also had its effects on the Mazeikiu Nafta refinery and company. With Yukos being forced to sell 
its assets, Mazeikiu Nafta was there for the taking, and it drew attention from several companies. 
Finally, Russian companies Lukoil and TNK-BP, Polish company PKN Orlen, and one 
Kazakhstani company ended up bidding. It was eventually PKN Orlen that won with a $1.49 
billion for Yuko‟s 53.7 percent stake, and $ 850 million for the 30.6 percent controlled by the 
Lithuanian government.
30
  
 
During the time that PKN Orlen was about to finalize the deal a fire erupted at the refinery and 
rumors and accusations were made about industrial sabotage on behalf of the Russians since they 
did not win the bid. Nothing has ever proved, however. Also, in February 2007, Lithuanian 
officials threatened to join Poland in blocking talks on a new European Union (EU)-Russia 
agreement as they were reacting to Transneft, Russia‟s state-controlled pipeline operator, shutting 
the Druzhba-1 pipeline link to Mazeikiu Nafta. There was speculation in the EU at the time that 
Russia was using the blockage to prevent Mazeikiu Nafta ending up in Polish, rather than 
Russian hands (Light 2008). Furthermore, two Lithuanian ministers resigned over disagreements 
regarding the country‟s oil sector and Mazeikiu Nafta and particular.31  
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To fully comprehend the complexity of this case, one has to be familiar with the EU‟s need for 
oil and gas, Russia‟s vast reserves of it, and the historical this between Russia and Lithuania. 
According to Cohen (2007), the EU is the world‟s largest importer of oil and gas, importing 82 
percent of its oil and 57 percent of its gas. What is more, EU imports are projected to rise 
dramatically over the next 25 years. As pointed out in the example of Sakhalin II, oil and gas is 
by far Russia‟s strongest foreign policy tool. Seeing that companies such as Gazprom and Lukoil 
account for a substantial share of Russia‟s economy, they can also be seen as “instruments - and 
sometime makers - of its foreign policy.”32 With Mazeikiu Nafta being the only crude oil refinery 
in the Baltic States, and consequently being of great strategic importance to Russia, it is not 
surprising that the country has shown great interest in the refinery. Mazeikiu Nafta, of course, is 
of tremendous importance to the Lithuanian economy. In 2001, almost 30 percent of the 
country‟s GDP stemmed from the refinery, and in 2000, the company contributed close to 25 
percent of Lithuania‟s gross tax revenues” (Zashev 2004). „Keeping Ivan off the pipe‟ was 
somewhat of a catchphrase in the Lithuanian government and foreign policy issues and 
preferences and attitudes arguably played a part as PKN Orlen won the bidding ahead of the 
Russian companies.   
 
Mazeikiu Nafta is a very special example in that it is the only crude oil refinery in the Baltic 
States and of such vital importance to the Lithuanian economy. Also, with Russia looking to 
increase its influence on oil and gas supply to Europe, as well as being the distributor of oil to the 
refinery, it is no surprise that Mazeikiu Nafta has been subjected to a great deal of controversy. 
The OBM and the need of a SLO are not specifically represented in relation to Mazeikiu Nafta. It 
was rather preferences and attitudes, along with foreign policy issues, that shaped the type of 
government intervention carried out by both the Lithuanian and the Russian governments. The 
basis for such a statement is that although the Russian interference might be seen as company 
driven, it is clear that Russia‟s use of oil and gas as a foreign policy tool is reflected in the actions 
of state controlled companies like Gazprom and Transneft.  
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4.3 The Camisea gas project 
 
The Camisea gas project has been subjected to great controversy. It is also a perfect example of 
the tremendous impact a mega project may have upon the local community and environment. 
Figure 5.3 depicts the causal framework of the Camisea project. Subsequently, a description of 
the project and its characteristics will be provided. 
 
Figure 5.3: Causal framework for Camisea 
 
Risk Insurance 
Risk Assessment Companies 
 
Human Rights Issues     Central Government  NGO Activism 
Environmental Issues    NGO Activism   Severe Social Unrest 
Laws, Regulations, and Bureaucracy  Shareholders    
Laws of foreign country 
OBM 
  Extremely Complex 
  Numerous stakeholders 
  Located in pristine rain forest with indigenous population  
 
The Camisea Gas field in Peru is the country‟s largest energy infrastructure project (Oxfam 2010) 
and it is also regarded as being the most important natural gas reserve in Latin America (Vences 
2006). Together, the two fields which together comprise the Camisea, Cashiriari and San Martín, 
hold proven reserves of 8.12 trillion cubic feet of gas and 516 million barrels of natural gas 
liquids (Oxfam 2010). Three distinct phases can be recognized in relation to the Camisea gas 
field. Phase one involved Royal Dutch/Shell which first started exploring the fields in the 1980s. 
The second phase involved further exploration by Shell/Mobil in the 1990s. The third phase 
involved bidding for the project, which was ultimately divided in two parts: the exploitation of 
the fields, and the transportation of gas and gas liquids (Vences 2006). The infrastructure 
includes an LNG plant, a marine loading terminal, and a new 408 kilometer pipeline (Oxfam 
2010). Shell, which initially showed a great interest in the project, ultimately backed out in 1998 
after years of disputing with various Peruvian governments over the course and specifics of the 
project, with investment also being blocked as a result of modifications in the contract (Vences 
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2006) and being hampered by the extreme complexity of the project, both in regards to technical 
and social issues. 
 
In 2000, the Peruvian government finally awarded a license to develop the fields to a consortium 
headed by Argentinian Pluspetrol and American Hunt Oil. The pipeline system was to be 
operated by Transportadora de Gas Peruano (TGP). Initially, it was a massive challenge to 
finance the USD 1.6 billion project
33
 due to the great environmental and social risks involved, as 
well as the Peruvian government‟s (lack of) ability and preparedness to address them (Oxfam 
2006). Ultimately, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) decided to engage and it worked 
as a catalyst for further investment (Oxfam 2006). IDB‟s decision to finance the project was very 
controversial, however, and “the United States abstained from voting in support of IDB‟s 
financing, partly because the project did not satisfy the conditions of the Pelosi Amendment to 
the US International Development and Finance Act of 1983” (Oxfam 2006:22). Lobbying by 
organizations such as Amazon Watch also led to delays in the investment but they were not 
successful in stopping the development of the project.
34
 
 
The Camisea field is, as drawn attention to, extremely complex and it indeed constituted a new 
type of project for Peru. Due to the extreme levels of complexity involved, it demanded “an 
unprecedented level of capacity, coordination, and attention from a variety of Peruvian 
government agencies” (Oxfam 2010:26). The problem was that the Peruvian central and 
municipal governments lacked experience in organizing a project of this scale and complexity 
(Ranganathan & Laestadius 2010). The same was also true for the pipeline operator TGP which 
had never previously undertaken a project of the size and complexity of Camisea (Oxfam 2006).  
 
Regarding the environmental and social impact of the project, Camisea is located in one of the 
world‟s most unspoiled rain forests, home to a number of groups of indigenous peoples, some 
even living in voluntary isolation (Oxfam 2006). Furthermore, the infrastructure and pipeline 
system “physically impact five of the 24 regions of Peru, three of which are among the poorest in 
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the nation” (Oxfam 2006:19). The devastating impact a project like Camisea can have upon the 
indigenous population is also well documented as 42 percent of the Nahua (another of Peru‟s 
indigenous groups) died from diseases contracted from outsiders in connection with logging 
activity in the 1980s.
35
 The Camisea project is a perfect example of the dichotomy between 
financial development and environmental preservation. Pratt (2007:778) arguably touches upon 
an important aspect when he argues that “the government wanted the royalties and income but 
was less keen to accept its responsibilities.” With its enormous reserves, the field obviously 
facilitates the possibility of great potential economic development for the affected regions and for 
Peru as a whole. A report commissioned by IDB estimated that the project can generate USD 4.5 
billion in fiscal revenues over the life of the project (Oxfam 2006). The key issue, though, is of 
course how the revenues are distributed and invested. Although the Peruvian government has 
introduced guidelines and policies for allocating the proceeds of the project, local communities 
have complained that it has not adequately resulted in programs with direct benefit to them 
(Oxfam 2006).   
 
The Camisea project was, and still is, highly controversial. Several gas spills, environmental 
degradation, government - community disputes, and NGO activism continue to „plague‟ the 
project. The numerous stakeholders involved in the project indeed contributes to its complexity; 
even though estimates vary from 50 to 500, it is clear that they provide for a wide range of 
possible interactions and consequently possible problems (Vences 2006:15). Camisea is thus a 
perfect example of how the success “of a modern day mega project hinge on complex interactions 
between stakeholder parties.” Conflicts in regards to extractive industries in Peru are not a new 
occurrence but it has been growing in recent years alongside growth in the industry. Indigenous 
groups have also previously shown their discontent, epitomized by the fact that they took control 
of facilities owned by Pluspetrol in connection with oil extraction in the Corrientes River Basin 
(Oxfam:2006). 
 
But are the ongoing challenges of the Camisea project a consequence of its mega project 
characteristics? It is clear that the location of the field has played a major role in determining the 
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level of activism and negative attention. Yet, one should not underestimate the specific mega 
project characteristics in this regard. Camisea was, as drawn attention to, a new type of project 
for Peru which involved a level of complexity and a level of organization not previously 
experienced. While eager to see profits, inadequate planning for reinvestment and inadequate 
assessment of the environmental and social impacts resulted in uproar, domestically as well as 
internationally. It seems fair to say that the key ingredient that must be in place for a successful 
mega project was lacking, namely the social license to operate.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
The rationale behind the investigation of this thesis was to uncover why oil and gas mega projects 
are considered to be specifically vulnerable to political risk, how political risk differ for oil and 
gas mega projects compared to projects in other industries, and to establish the causal 
mechanisms at play. Three key elements stood out as particularly important in this regard: (1) the 
view of mega projects as carriers of increased risk, complexity, and scrutiny, (2) the need of a 
social license to operate, and, (3) the importance of the obsolescing bargain mechanism. 
Although emphasizing the substantial effects mega projects may have upon the local society and 
environment, existing theory and research have paid foremost attention to the workings of 
political institutions and government intervention. As a result of this, the OBM has been pointed 
out as a key element in understanding the causal mechanisms behind political risk. Based on the 
conclusions of this thesis, that postulation carries weight. It is clear, though, that the effects local 
society and citizens may have upon oil and gas mega projects have not been substantially taken 
notice of.  
 
In regards to realized political risk effects, elements related to the need of a SLO clearly stand out 
as most important for oil and gas mega projects. For oil and gas mega projects excluding the 
Nigerian examples, and for my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset, on the other hand, elements 
related to the OBM stand out as most relevant. What is particularly interesting, however, is that 
political risk effects such as sabotage, terrorism, kidnapping, and hostage taking are the most 
common effects for all three investigations and the link to a need of a SLO is hence evident. As 
far as actors are concerned, the main distribution follows the same pattern albeit not as markedly 
The reasons for this are that there are often several actors responsible for carrying out a political 
risk effect, and that the main categories of „rebel/terrorist organization‟ and „non-governmental 
activist‟ both can be seen as linked to the need of a SLO. In regards to the OBM, central 
governments are significant actors across all three levels of analyses. Concerning the need of a 
SLO, „rebel movements/militants,‟ „local communities/citizens,‟ and „NGO/activist‟ stand out as 
most important. With focus on sources of political risk; along the main dimensions, the need of a 
SLO stand as the most important factor for all three groups of exploration, and „war/armed 
conflict or rebel activity‟ are the most prevalent sources of political risk for all three groups.   
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Seeing that the conclusions of this thesis so clearly accentuate the need of a SLO as an integral 
part in understanding the causal mechanisms of political risk, not only for oil and gas mega 
projects, but also for ventures in other industries, it seems fair to argue that existing political risk 
theory has neglected its importance through an overly focus on elements related to the OBM. 
That is not to say, however, that the OBM should not be approached as a possibly serious 
impediment to project objectives. As previously highlighted, it indeed poses a significant risk. 
What it does tell us, though, is simply that equal attention must be given to the importance of 
attaining a SLO. 
 
A key point of this thesis is that political risk must be regarded as a multidimensional 
phenomenon where the host country is not the only subject of investigation. This is supported by 
the fact that foreign states and their institutions are frequent contributors to realized political risk 
effects. That is not to say, however, that host country specifics should be taken lightly. There is 
no universal rule of how to achieve a SLO or how to avoid the workings of the OBM and both of 
these elements can be seen as highly host country, industry, and project specific. Political risk is 
hence a complex phenomenon where several sources and actors contribute to a realized political 
risk effect. The characteristics of an oil and gas mega project, however, means that they are more 
at risk than smaller projects, both within the oil and gas industry and across other industries. As a 
result of this, oil and gas mega projects have to be extra careful in achieving a SLO and be aware 
of the fact that the OBM is a real and powerful threat. As regards host country characteristics, the 
findings of this thesis show that the OBM is more prevalent in strong-rule countries where the 
institutional framework is potent enough to carry out such actions. Elements related to the need 
of a SLO, on the other hand, appear to be generally more frequent in semi-democratic countries 
where political- and social stability is lacking. Another interesting observation of this thesis, 
though, is the similarity of the causal mechanisms involved for the two units of investigation. 
Both main dimensions and sub-categories are remarkably alike for both sets of data and 
especially so with the exclusion of the Nigerian examples. Even though the distribution is more 
concentrated around certain sub-categories for oil and gas mega projects, it is clear that the 
relationship is more parallel than what was expected. It is important, however, to recognize the 
differences that actually exist and not be blinded by the apparent similarities. This thesis indeed 
underlines that industry- and project specific approaches to political risk are warranted and that it 
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can often be the difference between project success and project failure. This is especially true in 
regards to both the OBM and the need of a SLO. 
 
The novelty of the investigation of this thesis is a double edged sword as there is little existing 
research to rely upon as reference and scaffolding. What is more, it is clear that political risk and 
mega projects are not easily operationalized into measurable entities, and performing an analysis 
that combines the two naturally increase the methodological issues involved. On a different note, 
it would have been beneficial to expand the dataset to include more recent events and perhaps 
included a regression analysis to check the robustness of some of the most important findings. 
Providing a specialized look on political risk, on the other hand, this thesis should be regarded as 
an introductory study of political risk for oil and gas mega project. The investigation of particular 
elements within the study is thus a task for further and more specific research. Regarding the 
coding scheme through which the examples of political risk events are classified, it could 
preferably have been narrowed down. This would not only make the presentation of the data 
more intelligible but it is also important in the sense that “categories should be mutually 
exclusive,” (Franzosi 1987:9) as drawn attention to in Chapter 3. Possible simplifications could 
be the grouping of elements related to the OBM and acts relating to war, terrorism, and social 
unrest.  
 
It is apparent that there are some methodological issues to the investigation of political risk for oil 
and gas mega projects but these shortcomings are not impossible to address. This paper can hence 
be seen as a gate opener for further research in the field. The fact that no clear universal 
definition exists in regards to neither political risk nor mega projects is a clear indication that 
more research is needed and although there is a need for further examination of political risk in 
general, specific recommendations can also be made. Seeing that a great deal of the world‟s oil 
and gas reserves are located in non-democratic countries, it would be useful to carry out an in-
depth analysis of how political risk differs in regards to democratic and non-democratic 
countries. Although briefly drawn attention to in this thesis, only theoretical postulations have 
been made and solid quantitative analyses are needed to uncover the causal mechanism involved.  
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From a mega project point of view, it could be interesting to perform a qualitative study of oil 
and gas mega project organizations with the purpose of uncovering how they approach the issue 
of political risk and how it is reflected in actual political risk effects. Although numerous studies 
have investigated determinates of project success in general, focus on oil and gas mega projects 
in particular is found wanting. Such a qualitative study could expose possible shortcomings at the 
managerial level and consequently lay the groundwork for increased awareness of political risk 
where it matters the most. Obviously beneficial to the oil and gas industry, it would also be of 
value for the host society. The need of a SLO is repeatedly pointed out as a key success factor for 
oil and gas mega project and if fulfilled, both parts would reap the benefits. These are only some 
suggestions of further research and the multidimensionality of political risk pose for a wide array 
of possible investigations. What is clear, however, is that political risk will remain a significant 
impediment to the global business environment and, in combination with the growing influx of 
mega projects and the continuing importance of oil and gas, this trinity should be a key area of 
investigation for future research.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Coding scheme – political risk effects 
1. Government intervention in or regulation of business 
1001 Price controls/tariff freeze/cap on profits 
1002 Regulations/taxes/bans on trade, production, investment, sales, withdrawal of funds, etc. 
1003 Corporate tax/royalty increases 
1004 Back-tax claims or disputed tax claims 
1005 Government or public control over operations/board/management 
1006 Fine 
1007 Bureaucratic/political delays (incl. payment delays) 
1008 Grand or petty corruption (incl. MNC-initiated bribes) 
1009 Problems related to business climate in general (incl. public services, lack of guarantees)   
1010 Intervention/sanction by foreign government 
1098 Other general or industry-wide policy changes 
1099 Other intervention/policy change/dispute 
1101 Nationalization, expropriation, or confiscation 
1102 Ownership restrictions (incl. forced sale and joint venture demands) 
1103 Blocking of investment (temporary or final, including termination of proposed deal) 
1201 Breach/termination/suspension of contract or license (incl. breach of promise) 
1202 Forced or unwanted contract renegotiation/revision/review 
1301 Disputed/arbitrary charges, court rulings, or legal process 
 
2. Acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest 
2001 Sabotage (incl. invasion/blockade/intrusion) and terrorism/armed attack (incl. threats) 
2002 War threat or severe instability and threat to physical safety 
2003 Kidnapping or hostage-taking 
2004 Protests, demonstrations, blockades against company (e.g. leading to delays) 
2005 Severe social unrest (incl. political strikes) 
 
3. Other acts committed by non-governmental actors 
3001 NGO activism (incl. campaigns in which other actors are involved) 
3002 Potentially detrimental lawsuit/compensation claims related to activism 
3101 Corruption (incl. MNC-initiated bribes) 
3102 Dispute with or fraudulent behavior by partner/competitor/offtaker/privatized firm 
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Table A2: Coding scheme – actors through which political risks are realized 
1. Central, regional, or local host government (incl. parliament/bureaucracy/judiciary) 
1001 Central government (incl. head of state, state bureaucracy, and parliament/congress) 
1002 Political parties/politicians (incl. political opposition) 
1003 Regional/local governments (incl. regional/local parliament or bureaucracy) 
1004 Judiciary/police 
1005 Military 
 
2. Rebel/terrorist organization (or ethnic/religious/political group) 
2001 Terrorist organization 
2002 Rebel movements/militants 
2003 Criminal organization 
 
3. Non-governmental activists (organized or non-organized) 
3001 NGO/activists 
3002 Consumers/buyers (i.e. boycotts) 
3003 Shareholders/investors 
3004 Workers/labor union 
3005 Local communities/citizens (incl. nation-wide movements and public opinion) 
 
4. Other companies 
4001 Domestic private partner/supplier/financier/offtaker/customer 
4002 Domestic non- private partner/supplier/financier/offtaker/customer 
4003 Domestic competitor 
4004 Foreign competitor/partner/supplier/offtaker/customer 
4005 Employee or local/HQ management of won company 
4099 Other 
 
5. Foreign state or multilateral organization 
5001 Foreign state 
5002 Multilateral organization 
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Table A3: Coding scheme – sources of political risk 
1. Socio-political instability and grievances 
1001 War/armed conflict or rebel activity (incl. ethnic or regional tensions/grievances) 
1002 Diplomatic tensions and foreign policy changes 
1003 Religious fervor/grievances 
1004 Social unrest (not religious or ethnic based and not project-specific; including general strikes) 
1011 Environmental issues 
1012 Human-rights issues 
1013 Local/regional project-specific grievances (incl. economic/cultural issues and consumer 
resistance) 
1014 Worker discontent 
1015 Other 
 
2. Political institutions 
2001 Authoritarianism (incl. general human-rights situation) 
2002 Rule of law (incl. contested/unlawful/arbitrary contract breaches/policy changes) 
2003 Decentralized or disputed authority 
2011 Laws, regulations, and bureaucracy 
2012 Reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns (e.g. through government change) 
2021 Corruption and cronyism  
2031 Institutions and laws of foreign country or multilateral organization) 
 
3. Preferences and attitudes 
3001 Economic nationalism and anti-foreign capital sentiments 
3002 National security issues 
3009 Other 
3011 Political ideologies (e.g. socialism, liberalism) 
3021 Vested business interest 
3029 Other (incl. corporate governance 
 
4001 Host-country macroeconomic/financial performance (incl. BoP, debt, and depreciation) 
5001 Company performance (incl. profits/prices/underinvestment/contract specification) 
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Table A4: Political risk effects by sub-categories, excluding the Nigerian examples 
 
                Count       Percentage 
1. Government intervention in or regulation of business       
1201 Breach/termination/suspension of contract or license    8  12.9 
1003 Corporate tax/royalty increases      5  8.1 
1004 Back-tax claims or disputed tax claims     3  4.8 
1007 Bureaucratic/political delays       3  4.8 
1010 Intervention/sanction by foreign government    3  4.8 
1103 Blocking of investment       2  3.2 
1202 Forced or unwanted contract renegotiation/revision/review  2  3.2 
1001 Price controls/tariff freeze/cap on profits    1  1.6 
1002 Regulations/taxes/bans on trade, production, etc.   1  1.6 
1008 Grand or petty corruption       1  1.6 
1099 Other intervention/policy change/dispute  1  1.6 
1102 Ownership restrictions        1  1.6 
 
2. Acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest 
2001 Sabotage and terrorism/armed attack      15  24.2 
2003 Kidnapping or hostage-taking      5  8.1 
2004 Protests, demonstrations, blockades against company    2  3.2 
2002 War threat or severe instability and threat to physical safety  1  1.6 
2005 Severe social unrest        1  1.6 
 
3. Other acts committed by non-governmental actors 
3001 NGO activism         3  4.8 
3002 Potentially detrimental lawsuit/compensation claims    3  4.8 
3101 Corruption         1  1.6 
 
Total          62  100 
 
Notes: As opposed to sources and actors where several categories come together, there is only one specific 
effect for one case. The numbers presented above are hence accurate and the percentage precise. 
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Table A5: Actors through which political risk are realized by sub categories, excluding the Nigerian 
examples 
Count      Percentage 
1. Central, regional, or local host government  
1001 Central government        24  38.7 
1002 Political parties/politicians       4  6.5 
1004 Judiciary/police       3  4.8 
1003 Regional/local governments       1  1.6 
 
2. Rebel/terrorist organization  
2002 Rebel movements/militants      14  22.6 
2001 Terrorist organization       2  3.2 
2003 Criminal organization       2  3.2 
 
3. Non-governmental activists  
3005 Local communities/citizens       11  17.7 
3001 NGO/activists        8  12.9 
3004 Workers/labor union       3  4.8 
3003 Shareholders/investors       2  3.2 
 
4. Other companies 
4005 Employee or local/HQ management of won company   2  3.2 
4001 Domestic private partner/supplier/financier/offtaker/customer  1  1.6 
4002 Domestic non- private partner/supplier/financier/offtaker/customer 1  1.6 
 
5. Foreign state or multilateral organization 
5001 Foreign state        8  12.9 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of several actors in certain cases, the total number of registered actors exceeds 
the number of cases in the dataset. The percentages indicated in the figure are in relation to the number of 
cases in the dataset, excluding the Nigerian examples. 
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Table A6: Sources of political risk by sub-categories, excluding the Nigerian examples 
 
                 Count      Percentage 
1. Socio-political instability and grievances 
1001 War/armed conflict or rebel activity      20  32.3 
1002 Diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues    10  16.1 
1004 Social unrest         9  14.5 
1013 Local/regional project-specific grievances     7  11.3 
1011 Environmental issues       6  9.7 
1012 Human-rights issues       5  8.1 
1015 Other         5  8.1 
1003 Religious fervor/grievances      2  3.2 
1014 Worker discontent       1  1.6 
 
2. Political institutions 
2012 Reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns     13  21.0 
2002 Rule of law         8  12.9 
2031 Institutions and laws of foreign country or multilateral organization 6  9.7 
2011 Laws, regulations, and bureaucracy     5  8.1 
2021 Corruption and cronyism      5  8.1 
2001 Authoritarianism        4  6.5 
2003 Decentralized or disputed authority     2  3.2 
 
3. Preferences and attitudes 
3001 Economic nationalism and anti-foreign capital sentiments  17  27.4 
3011 Political ideologies        3  4.8 
3021 Vested business interest      3  4.8 
3002 National security issues       1  1.6 
3009 Other         1  1.6 
3029 Other (incl. corporate governance     1  1.6 
 
4001 Host-country macroeconomic/financial performance    3  4.8 
5001 Company performance        13  21.0 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of multiple sources, the total number of registered sources exceeds the number 
of cases in the dataset. The numbers in the figure are in relation to the number of cases in the dataset, 
excluding the Nigerian examples, and reflect the count and percentage of cases where the source in 
question is regarded as having contributed to a realized political risk effect. 
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Figure A1: Political risk effects by main dimensions (my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
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Table A7: Political risk effects by-sub categories (my modification of Jakobsens‟s dataset) 
 
            Count    Percentage 
1.        Government intervention in or regulation of business 
1201     Breach/termination/suspension of contract or license   24  10.0 
1103     Blocking of investment      12  5.0 
1002     Regulations/taxes/bans on trade, production, investments, sales, etc. 11  4.6 
1010     Intervention/sanctions by foreign government    11  4.6 
1102     Ownership restrictions      10  4.2 
1001     Price controls/tariff freeze/cap on profits    8  3.3 
1008     Grand or petty corruption      6  2.5 
1099     Other intervention/policy change/dispute    6  2.5 
1101     Nationalization, expropriation, or confiscation    6  2.5 
1007     Bureaucratic/political delays      5  2.1 
1098     Other general or industry-wide policy changes    5  2.1 
1301     Disputed/arbitrary charges, court ruling, or legal process  5  2.1 
1005     Government or public control over operations/board/management 4  1.7 
1202     Forced or unwanted contract renegotiation/revision/reviews  3  1.3 
1003     Corporate tax/royalty increases      2  0.8 
1004     Back-tax claims or disputed tax claims     2  0.8 
1009     Problems related to business climate in general    2  0.8 
1006     Fine      1  0.4 
 
2.        Acts relating to war, terrorism, or social unrest 
2001     Sabotage and terrorism/armed attack     30  12.5 
2003     Kidnapping or hostage-taking      26  10.8 
2002     War threat or severe instability and threat to physical safety  16  6.7 
2005     Severe social unrest      7  2.9 
2004     Protests, demonstrations, blockades against company   3  1.3 
 
3.        Other acts committed by non-governmental actors 
3001     NGO activism      22  9.2 
3002     Potentially detrimental lawsuit/compensation claims rel. to activism 6  2.5 
3102     Dispute with or fraudulent behavior by partner/competitor/offtaker/ 5  2.1 
             privatized firm         
3101     Corruption      2  2.1 
 
Total      240  100 
 
Notes: As opposed to sources and actors where several categories come together, there is only one specific 
effect for one case. The numbers presented above are hence accurate and the percentage precise. 
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Figure A2: Actors through which political risks are realized by main dimensions (my modification of 
Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
                                                                                         
        Number of incidents of political risk effects 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of multiple actors, the total number of registered actors exceeds the number of 
cases in the dataset. The numbers in the figure are in relation to the number of cases in the dataset and 
reflect the count and percentage of cases where the actor in question is regarded as having contributed to a 
realized political risk effect. 
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Table A8: Actors through which political risks are realized by cub-categories (my modification of 
Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
 
              Count      Percentage 
 
1.        Central, regional, or local host government 
1001     Central government      90  37.5 
1003     Regional/local government      20  8.3 
1004     Judiciary/police      15  6.3 
1002     Political parties/politicians      6  2.5 
1005     Military      3  1.3 
 
2.        Rebel/terrorist organization 
2002     Rebel movement/militants      52  21.7 
2001     Terrorist organization      8  3.3 
2003     Criminal organization      2  0.8 
      
3.        Non-governmental activists 
3001     NGO/activists      31  12.9 
3005     Local communities/citizens      30  12.5 
3004     Workers/labor union      16  6.7 
3002     Consumer/buyers      5  2.1 
3003     Shareholders/investors      3  1.3 
 
4.       Other companies 
4002     Domestic non-private partner/supplier/financer/offtaker/customer 11  4.6 
4003     Domestic competitor      10  4.2 
4001     Domestic private partner/supplier/financer/offtaker/customer  8  3.3 
4005     Employee or local/HQ management of own company   8  3.3 
4004     Foreign competitor/partner/supplier/offtaker/customer   6  2.5 
 
5.        Foreign state or multilateral organization  
5001     Foreign state      26  10.8 
5002     Multilateral organization      2  0.8  
 
Notes: Due to the existence of several actors in certain cases, the total number of registered actors exceeds 
the number of cases in the dataset. The percentages indicated in the figure are in relation to the number of 
cases (240) in the dataset. 
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Figure A3: Sources of political risk by main dimension (my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of incident of political risk effects 
Notes: Due to the existence of multiple sources, the total number of registered sources exceeds the number 
of cases in the dataset. The numbers in the figure are in relation to the number of cases (240) in the dataset 
and reflect the count and percentage of cases where the source in question is regarded as having 
contributed to a realized political risk effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 (62.1 %) 
109 (45.4 %) 
74 (31.3 %) 
30 (12.5 %) 
9 (3.8 %) 
0 50 100 150 200
Socio-political instability and grievances
Political institutions
Preferences and attitudes
Company performance
Host country macroeconomic/financial
performance
 
 
- 87 - 
 
Table A9: Sources of political risk by sub categories (my modification of Jakobsen‟s dataset) 
 
              Count      Percentage 
1.        Socio-political instability and grievances 
1001     War/armed conflict or rebel activity     62  25.8 
1002     Diplomatic tensions and foreign policy issues    36  15.0 
1013     Local/regional project-specific grievances    26  10.8 
1011     Environmental issues      18  7.5 
1004     Social unrest      13  5.4 
1019     Other      12  5.0 
1003     Religious fervor/grievances      10  4.2 
1014     Worker discontent      8  3.3 
1012     Human-rights issues      5  2.1 
 
2.        Political institutions 
2002     Rule of law      37  15.4 
2012     Reforms, policy changes, rulings, campaigns    29  12.1 
2021     Corruption and cronyism      26  10.8 
2011     Laws, regulations, and bureaucracy     18  7.5 
2031     Institutions and laws of foreign country or multilateral organization 15  6.3 
2001     Authoritarianism      14  5.8 
2003     Decentralized or disputed authority     9  3.8 
       
3.        Preferences and attitudes 
3021     Vested business interests      29  12.1 
3001     Economic nationalism and anti-foreign capital sentiments  23  9.6 
3011     Political ideologies      16  6.7 
3002     National security issues      10  4.2 
3009     Other      2  0.8 
3029     Other (inc. corporate governance)     2  0.8 
 
4001     Host-country macroeconomic/financial performance   9  3.8 
 
5001     Company performance      30  12.5 
 
Notes: Due to the existence of several actors in certain cases, the total number of registered actors exceeds 
the number of cases in the dataset. The percentages indicated in the figure are in relation to the number of 
cases (240) in the dataset. 
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Table A10: Dataset in alphabetical order 
COUNTRY YEAR EFF. ACT. 1 ACT. 2 ACT.3 SOU.1 SOU.2 SOU.3 SOU.4 
 
Afghanistan 1998 2002 5001 
  
1001 1002                  
 Argentina 2002 1002 1001 
  
4001 
   Bangladesh 2001 1007 1002 3005 1004 3001 2002 
  Bolivia 2003 1007 3005 1002 
 
1004 1002 3001        2012 22 
Bolivia 2004 2001 3005 
  
1004 1019 
  Bolivia 2004 1003 3005 1002 1001 1004 1002 3001        2012 20 
Bolivia 2005 1003 1001 3005 3004 3001 2012 1004 
 Colombia 1998 2001 2001 
  
1001 3001 
  Colombia 1998 2001 2002 
  
1001 3001 
  Colombia 1998 2001 2002 
  
1001 1012 
  Colombia 1998 2004 3005 3001 1004 1013 1011 2011 
 Colombia 2000 2001 2002 
  
1001 3001 
  Colombia 2001 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Colombia 2001 2001 2002 
  
1001 
   Colombia 2002 2001 2002 
  
1001 
   Ecuador 1999 2003 2003 
  
1019 
   Ecuador 2000 2003 2003 
  
1019 
   Ecuador 2002 2004 3005 3001 
 
1013 1011 1004       1019 
 Ecuador 2002 2003 2002 
  
1001 
   Ecuador 2003 3002 3005 3001 
 
1011 2011 
  Ecuador 2005 1202 1001 3005 
 
3001 1004 5001 
 Falkland Isl. 1998 1010 5001 
  
1002 
   India 2004 1004 1001 
  
5001 
   Indonesia 2001 2001 2002 
  
1001 
   Indonesia 2001 3002 3001 3005 
 
1012 1001 2031 
 Indonesia 2001 2001 3005 
  
1013 1004 
  Indonesia 2001 1007 1001 
  
2012 
   Indonesia 2001 2001 2002 
  
1001 
   Iran 2003 3101 4001 4005 5001 2021 3021 2031 
 Iran 2003 1010 5001 
  
1002 
   Iraq 2002 1201 1001 
  
2031 2002 1002     5001 
 Iraq 2003 1201 5001 
  
5001 2021 
  Kazakhstan 2002 1201 1001 1004 
 
2002 5001 
  Kazakhstan 2003 1008 1001 4005 5001 2021 2031 
  Lithuania 1999 1103 1001 
  
3001 1002 
  Myanmar 2002 3002 3001 3004 
 
1012 2031 
  Nigeria 1998 2001 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 1998 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 1999 2005 3005 
  
1013 
   Nigeria 1999 2005 3005 
  
1013 
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Nigeria 1999 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 1999 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 1999 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 1999 1201 1001 
  
2012 2021 
  Nigeria 2000 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 2000 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 2000 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 2001 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 1011 
 Nigeria 2001 2001 2002 
  
1001 1013 1011 
 Nigeria 2001 3002 3005 
  
1012 2031 
  Nigeria 2002 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 2002 2001 3005 
  
1013 1001 
  Nigeria 2002 2001 3005 
  
1013 
   Nigeria 2002 2001 3005 
  
1013 
   Nigeria 2003 2002 2002 1005 
 
1001 
   Nigeria 2003 2003 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 2004 2005 3004 
  
1014 3001 
  Nigeria 2004 2001 3005 
  
1013 
   Nigeria 2004 1006 1001 
  
1011 2002 
  Nigeria 2004 1008 1001 5001 4005 2021 2031 
  Nigeria 2005 2001 3005 
  
1013 
   Nigeria 2005 2001 3005 
  
1013 
   Nigeria 2005 2002 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Nigeria 2005 2001 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Pakistan 2001 3001 3001 
  
1011 
   Peru 1998 1099 1001 
  
2011 
   Peru 2003 3001 3001 3003 
 
1011 
   Peru 2003 2003 2002 
  
1001 
   Russia 2004 1201 1001 
  
2021 2002 3001 
 Russia 2004 1202 1001 4002 
 
3021 3001 2002 
 Russia 2005 1004 1001 
  
2002 
   Russia 2005 1103 1001 
  
3001 2012 
  Russia 2005 1201 1001 
  
2012 5001 
  Sao T. & Pr. 2001 1201 1001 
  
2012 5001 
  Saudi Arabia 2003 1201 1001 
  
3001 5001 
  Saudi Arabia 2004 2001 2001 
  
1003 
   Sudan  1999 2001 2002 
  
1001 
   Sudan  2000 3001 3001 3003 5001 1001 1012 2001 
 Sudan  2005 1201 1003 
  
2003 2012 1001 
 Ukraine 2005 1001 1001 
  
1002 2012 
  Venezuela 2001 1003 1001 
  
2001 2012 3011      3001 
 Venezuela 2002 2005 3004 1002 
 
2001 1004 
  Venezuela 2004 1003 1001 
  
3001 5001 4001 
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Venezuela 2005 1004 1001 
  
2012 5001 
  Venezuela 2005 1102 1001 
  
3011 2011 2012      5001 
 Venezuela 2005 1003 1001 
  
3001 2002 5001 
 Yemen 1998 2001 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Yemen 1999 2001 2002 
  
1001 1013 
  Yemen 1999 2001 2002 
  
1001 
   More** 2001 1010 5001 
  
1002 
    
 
         More**: Libya and Iran 
Note: „Year‟ denotes the year the political risk effect was realized; „EFF.‟ denotes the effects; „ACT.1-3‟ 
represent the different actors through which political risks are realized; „SOU. 1-4‟ represent the 
underlying sources of political risk.  
 
 
 
